Bidinotto

A point of clarification. Phil, in our discussions the past year, my point was not to discourage discussions with fellow Objectivists about Objectivism. It was to discourage Objectivists from wasting their time arguing with fanatics. It was very clear that many of the people you were arguing with were stone-deaf dogmatists who had no intention of having honest discussions. THAT was a waste of time. That said, as you and many others are aware, my first priority has been exactly what you were talking about: writing and publishing material that translates Objectivist ideas for NON-Objectivist general audiences. I've been doing that for decades, in fact, from my days with Reader's Digest and local newspapers until the present. Speaking of the present, you may have heard of The New Individualist. The magazine I edit (and contribute articles to) is growing rapidly in size, quality, and circulation with every issue. And it is not a movement magazine; it is an outreach magazine, aimed at intelligent NON-Objectivists. Just pulled some wall-to-wall all-nighters to get the March issue done. Thousands of extra copies will be printed and distributed at the Conservative Political Action Conference in Washington, an annual convention where a zillion people on the right, many very influential, show up to talk and argue and broadcast their talk shows. My cover feature, "Up from Conservatism," is aimed right between their eyes; directly addressing conservatives, it takes no prisoners, and I think it will be much noted and discussed. I am also sure that talk-show invitations will come from it, as well. So, for me, it is not an either-or. Yes, I do discuss what's going on within the movement with other Objectivists, because we have to get the philosophy--and its public reputation-- right. The Tracinski controversy is about fundamental issues pertaining to Objectivism's meaning; thus, it's important, and needs to be addressed. The main issue is not about ARI purging Tracinski, but purging from Objectivism the common-sense point of view that he represents. Still, I spend the vast bulk of my time doing just what you said: talking to and writing for people outside the movement, in language they can understand. And I think I do it pretty well.

For those of you having trouble understanding the controversy about Robert Tracinski's views, or that controversy's critical importance for Objectivism: I found a very interesting thread starting here, whose author cleverly puts, in simple Q&A form, the questions that Tracinski has raised about Objectivism's philosophy of history, and his own views and answers. It is probably the most lucid, concise, and easy-to-grasp formulation on these matters that has been posted to date. Start with that first post, then read the ones immediately following it that are posted by the same writer. I urge everyone here to read that thread, because the issues that Tracinski raises are very important for Objectivism. Just as important is the damnation that he has received for raising these concerns -- and what that tells you about those damning him.

Believe it or not, Chris, I REMEMBER that article. But not the quotation. I think the article was titled, "The Cult of Angry Ayn Rand," or something like that. Ring a bell?

Yeah. I love that one, too, Chris. Very funny.

Charles, those are excellent observations. I feel exactly the same way: I had previously been unimpressed with Tracinski, but in his several years of writing independently of ARI, he appears to have begun to think outside of their box, confronting reality directly rather than through the imposed filter of their dogma. Ironically, he is living proof that you shouldn't write people off!

In case anyone is interested in checking the latest body counts in the recent intramural ARIan Wars, Stephen Speicher's criticisms of Robert Mayhew and other opponents of Tracinski are getting testier by the day. The significance of this is that it's further evidence of serious faultlines in the foundations of ARI. Like Tracinski, Speicher and his wife, Betsy, have been integrally involved with ARI for about a million years, and run their own high-traffic Objectivist discussion site for ARI-affiliated folks. I believe Betsy even has something to do with producing the ARI monthly newsletter. They and quite a few others participating in their online discussions have been highly critical of Peikoff, Mayhew, and other ARI leaders for their idiotic position on the recent elections (i.e., voting for any Republican proves you really don't understand Objectivism), and for their vicious pack-animal assaults against Tracinski, who has committed the unforgivable sin of rejecting dogma for common sense. Some of these critics of the ARIan hierarchy are even saying things remarkably similar to what I've been posting here...although I'm sure they would DIE before ever acknowledging such a thing. For anyone curious, my interest in all this is simple and straightforward: I care about the intellectual legacy of Ayn Rand. The future of Objectivism will be decided to a great extent based on whether her ideas come to be publicly associated with the likes of Peikoff, Schwartz, Mayhew, etc. -- or whether they come to be seen as best embodied by independent Objectivist thinkers, such as the now unaffiliated Tracinski, some of you folks here and at RoR, and (dare I say it?) those of us at The Atlas Society.

Michael, one obvious problem with demonstrating the validity of the "trickle down" theory is that with so many thinkers to pick from, you can always point to one -- obscure or not -- whom you can designate as the "cause" of anything that followed in history, good or bad. All you have to do is cherry-pick the one thinker among legions whose ideas best "explain" the events that follow, then credit or blame him for them. Then there's the issue of volition vis-a-vis the "power of philosophy." For example, one can look at the Founding Fathers and trace their individual intellectual pedigrees back to certain pivotal Enlightenment figures. But that's because they chose to accept the ideas of those thinkers. What about Europe? The works of those same Enlightenment figures (for example, Locke) were as accessible to Europeans as Americans, perhaps more so. So why didn't they choose to accept their ideas? Clearly, the ideas of the better Enlightenment figures had no causal efficacy on their own. What I'm driving at is this: philosophical determinism, like all forms of determinism, is false. Ideas don't have a "power" of their own. They are so much ink and noise until grasped and accepted by active minds who then choose to implement them.

In case you haven't noticed, there are a number of rumblings in the ARIan camp itself where people are catching on and challenging the various personal attacks on Robert Tracinski and distortions of his views. Veteran ARIan Steve Speicher has been outspoken about this sort of thing in recent weeks, such as in this post. Here's another fellow who concludes, rightly, that ARI jihadists are only giving themselves a public black eye. Well, there are precedents.

A friend just wrote to me saying, "Once he put the plastic bag around his brother's head I turned to my wife and said, Jack is back!" Yeah. Nothing like a nuke to straighten out one's life priorities.

I agree with Robert Campbell's observations about the merits of Tracinski's thesis. Incidentally, ARI's academic strategy -- placing scholars in philosophy departments, in order to implement the "trickle down" theory -- is patently refuted by Ayn Rand's own example. Rand managed to launch a philosophical revolution and to recruit thousands to it (including ARIans) without ever getting a Ph.D., holding an academic position, or publishing in established scholarly journals. And she did it largely through writing FICTION. Has any academic ARIan -- or any other Objectivist -- remotely approached her success and influence? The fact is that the academic "trickle down" model worked best during the Middle Ages, when universities were the sole source of philosophical ideas and their transmission into the culture. But that model is long dead. Today, there are innumerable parallel sources of ideas entering our culture: think tanks as well as countless unaffiliated thinkers, all originating and spreading ideas via the numerous vehicles of modern communication, including self-publishing, the Internet, broadcasting, audio-video recordings and transmission, satellite relays, etc. The university monopoly on ideas has been broken, rendering the old "trickle down" strategy largely irrelevant...as Rand's own example demonstrates. How many of YOU first heard of Ayn Rand from a college philosophy professor?

Neil: Forget about Commager's own politics, which are liberal: they only show up in Empire of Reason in the form of his personal disagreement with the Founders about the perils of unlimited democracy. However, he describes the Founders views on this accurately and well. Other than that, the book is a magnificent tribute to the Enlightenment era, so much so that I simply couldn't imagine one better. Commager's point about the differences between Europe and America included the fact that institutional (largely political-economic) barriers in Europe prevented it from enacting much of the Enlightenment agenda; that America, precisely because of its newness and freedom, could enact that agenda and did. These institutional barriers, then, served as their own "cause." Other causes could be cited at various times: for example, plagues, droughts, economic catastrophes, dictators, invasions, assassinations, and other emergencies can completely divert the course of a nation or culture, compelling people to pursue directions and actions contrary to prevailing intellectual trends. Then, of course, there's the intervention of that little causal factor known as "volition." To say that people must have an "idea" in their heads in order to act is a simple truism; to say that such ideas must be "philosophical" is not -- not unless "philosophy" is defined so elastically as to mean almost any notion at all. In which case, "philosophy" has simply become a synonym for "mind," which is a vacuous version of the "power of philosophy." Remember, the traditional Objectivist account of the "power of philosophy," and how ideas "trickle down" from philosophers and academics into the culture, is described in the David Kelley quotation provided by Michael Kelly yesterday (above). It is a very tidy model of ideas descending from academia and spreading out into the culture through various intellectual levels and branches -- something like an inverted tree, with the roots at the top. Of course, Tracinski is not denying the power of philosophy, nor the validity and importance of Objectivism. He is merely saying that the actual reality of the transmission and acceptance of philosophical ideas in a culture is much less tidy and more complicated than that model -- and I agree with him. For that transgression, he is being written out of the Objectivist movement by ARI, on the absurd grounds that he really doesn't believe at all in the "power of philosophy." Interestingly enough, however, Ayn Rand herself did not publish a formal account of any such a "philosophy of history": here are the only things SHE ever wrote publicly, as compiled yesterday by long-time ARI acolyte Betsy Speicher. Now this poses an interesting problem for Peikoff and ARI. If "Objectivism" is ONLY what Ayn Rand herself wrote and said (ARI's claim), but Rand never provided any formal "philosophy of history," then how can Peikoff and ARI now declare that their "trickle-down" theory of the philosophy of history is part of Objectivism -- and how can they thus conclude that by challenging it, Tracinski (or anyone else) is not an "Objectivist"? Understand that this latest Objectivist movement controversy, like all those preceding it, is not ultimately about who is right or wrong on some such theoretical point. It's solely about exercising control over that movement. It's about forbidding anyone to even question Peikoff and ARI muckamucks on any point of their theology, no matter how peripheral, and still retain the label "Objectivist."

Neil, for a very different and utterly persuasive counter-view, try The Empire of Reason by Henry Steele Commager. A magnificent and inspiring work. You can probably find it on Amazon; if not, try Bookfinder.com -- a great online source of new and used books.

In case my preceding post wasn't clear enough: The conventional, rationalistic philosophy of history as promoted by Peikoff, Mayhew, and Company has long been vulnerable to obvious empirical challenges, such as those recently put forth by Tracinski. It simply fails to explain historical causation in many instances. Why did the greatest philosophers of ancient Greece come at its end, not its beginning? Why was Europe the generator of Enlightenment philosophy, but why were Enlightenment ideas only fully adopted and institutionalized in America? Etc. Tracinski dared to question their rationalistic model: that philosophy, and only philosophy, is the ultimate source of all cultural change. Well, the ARI crowd had to respond. Their method? To redefine the term "philosophy" so elastically as to make it seem able to explain, or cause, anything! Specifically, the Mayhew Method of criticizing Tracinski (immediately endorsed by the rest of the ARI claque) appears to be this: (1) Inflate the definition of "philosophy" so broadly as to include almost any vague attitude, notion, or sense-of-life outlook anyone has ever held (e.g., "philosophy in the broadest sense," "implicit philosophy," "primitive or pre-philosophies," etc.); (2) proclaim that the (undeniable) historical impact of all this "philosophy in the broadest sense" refutes Tracinski's contention that other factors, not just "philosophy" (which he meant in the narrow sense), have important causal influences upon history; and thus (3) declare that by ignoring the power of "philosophy in the broadest sense," Tracinski proves that he doesn't take "philosophy" seriously as such -- and, hence, cannot be an Objectivist. Cute, eh?

Robert Tracinski's posts to date that are most relevant to this topic can be found here: http://www.intellectualactivist.com/php-bi...cle.php?id=1095 http://www.intellectualactivist.com/php-bi...cle.php?id=1096 http://www.intellectualactivist.com/php-bi...cle.php?id=1097 Robert Mayhew's critique of Tracinski's viewpoint is posted here: http://www.dianahsieh.com/blog/2007/01/wha...tracinskis.html What do I think of all this? In answer to a correspondent who wrote me for my opinion of Mayhew's critique, I sent the following response. --------------- I read Mayhew's piece earlier this a.m. What struck me about it is that, in essence, he's rewriting the traditional, rationalistic, "trickle-down-from-the-philosophy-departments" view of Objectivism's philosophy of history and cultural change, in order to deflect criticisms by Tracinski (and others) that it's too oversimplified an account of how ideas really affect culture. In answer to Tracinski's criticism of the conventional Objectivist philosophy of history -- i.e., that explicit, systematic philosophy doesn't seem to have sole causal efficacy in history and culture -- Mayhew sets up a straw-man account of Tracinski's actual views. Mayhew argues that Tracinski ignores the influence of "implicit philosophy" (or "philosophy in the broadest sense"), and asserts that the Objectivist philosophy of history really incorporates "implicit philosophy" as a causal factor in history. As Mayhew puts it: Note his terms "the basic world-view" and "implicit philosophy" and "philosophy in the broadest sense." What else could these terms mean other than "sense of life"? However, Rand distinguishes "sense of life" from "philosophy." As she wrote: "A sense of life is a pre-conceptual equivalent of metaphysics, an emotional, subconsciously integrated appraisal of man and of existence. It sets the nature of a man's emotional responses and the essence of his character" (from "Philosophy and Sense of Life"). Now compare Rand's definition of "sense of life" with what Mayhew describes as "The basic world-view of the ancient Greeks (their philosophy in the broadest sense... (I have in mind the implicit philosophy or basic ideas that we find in Homer and Hesiod...) It was essentially a this-worldly and pro-man outlook, which valued reason and argumentation." Can you determine any difference between this description of early Greek "world-view," and early Greek "sense of life"? I can't. Yet, where Rand carefully distinguishes "sense of life" from philosophy, Mayhew conflates them -- and he then, in effect, criticizes Tracinski for not doing so. By this means, Mayhew pretends that Tracinski is belittling the power of "philosophy" (really, sense of life) as such, and therefore is not really an Objectivist. This argument is complete sophistry. Tracinski does not argue that sense of life, or "implicit philosophy," has no impact on culture. In fact, he's saying the opposite: that the rationalistic philosophy of history presented by Peikoff, Mayhew, and others does not properly incorporate non-philosophical factors, such as sense of life! Now, regarding the details of Mayhew's historical account: observe that nowhere does he demonstrate any direct, causal connections between explicit philosophical thinkers, such as Thales, and any specific, subsequent developments or achievements in Greek art and science. To the contrary, note once again this passage from Mayhew: But doesn't this beg Tracinski's basic question: Where did Homer and Hesiod's "this-worldly and pro-man outlook" come from...since it preceded the emergence of explicit philosophers such as Solon and Thales, and the rest of the thinkers whom Mayhew cites? All of Mayhew's subsequent blather merely obfuscates that damning point: that huge achievements in the arts and other cultural institutions [of Greece] were already underway prior to, and to all appearances independent of, the subsequent work of theoretical philosophers. Moreover, the best Greek philosophizing -- that of Aristotle -- came at the very end of the period of Greek flourishing, not at its beginning, and seemed to have little influence in preventing Greece's subsequent decline and fall. Factors other than philosophy alone must be considered in order to account for all this. And that is the essence of Tracinski's common-sense criticism of the conventional Objectivist account of the impact of ideas on history. Finally, there is this from Mayhew: Note: "there was no doubt a spiraling effect." In other words, Mayhew is acknowledging another of Tracinski's key points: that ideas and developments in other fields influence each other, and the culture, in all sorts of complex ways. Those other "developments" most assuredly have causal impacts long belittled as secondary or derivative in the rationalistic philosophy of history, as pushed by Peikoff and his associates. Mayhew concludes: "But there is no reason to think that anything other than philosophy--especially the basic philosophical outlook that I sketched at the outset--was the most fundamental force driving the culture." Yet by his own historical account, which fails to adequately explain the huge achievements of Greek culture even before Thales, Mayhew cannot and does not demonstrate this conclusion. The onus of proof remains on Mayhew (and Peikoff, et al.) to provide a theory that takes this apparent causal disjunction into account.

Let me add, Judith, that while Season One was terrific, Seasons Two and Three were disappointing. The subplots were often inane and embarrassing, though the seasons were redeemed by the Jack Bauer character and some truly stellar moments. However, the series regained its footing in Seasons Four and Five, which were simply fabulous. Season Six is off to a roaring start, too. If you can stick through the second and third seasons -- mandatory, if you want to follow the continuing story lines of the various characters -- you'll be amply rewarded by the later installments.

Don't start watching until you clear your calendar. The episodes are like potato chips: you can't just consume one and stop.

Robert Tracinski has finally broken his silence on his split with ARI. While he indicates that he and ARI have not really been working closely for some time now, the most relevant line in his message is this: "Why they [ARI] chose to change that description [of my affiliation] now, and why they chose to do it in those particular words, I don't know." Yeah. Sure. Right. In fact, that sentence confirms exactly what I suspected: that the ARI public declaration of Tracinski's non-affiliation was the organization's none-too-subtle way of declaring: "Good riddance." Whether you wish to characterize that declaration as a "purge" or not seems a matter more semantic than substantive. Incidentally, some of Tracinski's most recent essays on the impact of philosophical ideas and other influences on history have been exceptionally powerful and perceptive. I was particularly taken with a point he made about Aristotle coming at the end, rather than at the beginning, of Greek civilization -- and of the seminal role that art, rather than abstract philosophy, had in launching the period of Greek flourishing. I noted and discussed exactly the same point many years ago, in the mid-80s, in a lecture and essay in which I criticized the rationalistic, "trickle-down" theory of the impact of ideas from philosophers into the culture, a theory quite popular in Objectivist circles. The actual path of influence of ideas on culture is far, far more complex than that, and involves other factors as well. (For example, why did Enlightenment ideas originate in Europe -- yet find their full implementation and expression only in America? Why did Europe imagine, but America realize, the Enlightenment? Institutional and political factors apart from philosophy played a decisive role in this outcome. For details, see Henry Steele Commager's brilliant history, The Empire of Reason.) I commend Tracinski for having the intelligence to perceive -- and the guts to discuss -- empirical subtleties that his dogmatic former associates either can't and won't. For my extended comments on this latest Objectivist split, click here.

I've posted my own thoughts on "24" here... http://bidinotto.journalspace.com/?entryid=488 ...including a commentary on those who think that Jack Bauer is acting "pragmatically" or "altruistically." Nothing could be further from the truth.

Wishing both of you all the best, in the new year and thereafter.

Well, in citing those examples, I for one was certainly acknowledging their presence in Rand's writing. But along with all the towering good, too.

To answer both Robert and Ellen: Yes, I think there are elements in Rand's works that can attract people with emotional problems, or -- absorbed uncritically -- can lead people, especially young people, in harmful directions. Here are a few: 1. Rand's perspectives about "moral compromise": There are a host of interrelated issues here, which I address in the talk that Robert Campbell mentions, "The Anatomy of Cooperation," the text of which is posted at the preceding link. Paranoia over moral inconsistency is not the same as a value-seeking attitude; yet this preoccupation is quite common in Rand, and hence in Objectivist circles. Rand's wonderful essay "Causality vs. Duty" brilliantly dissects this malady, but ironically, elements in her writing unfortunately contribute to the very duty-bound self-consciousness that her essay repudiates. 2. Social indignation and pessimism: These angry emotional subcurrents are most obvious and explicit in her notes for the never-written early story "The Little Street," her play Ideal, the closing comments in her "Introduction to The Romantic Manifesto," her notes for the projected novel To Lorne Dieterling, the character of Dominique Francon in The Fountainhead, the "tunnel disaster" scene in Atlas Shrugged, and many post-Atlas nonfiction essays. A negative expectancy about people, and a constant state of moral indignation about less-than-ideal social encounters, is no way to live a happy life. But what can readers be expected to absorb when Rand at times refers to the society around her as "an enemy world"? 3. "Moral sanctions" as weapons: Switching the focus in every social encounter from seeking personal values, to exercising a virtual duty to verbalize "moral judgments" at every turn, has been extremely harmful to many -- especially in conjunction with Rand's ideas about "moral compromise" and her social pessimism, mentioned above. Face it: If you believe that most people are immoral and irrational, that any inconsistency constitutes a complete and irredeemable "breach of integrity," and that "failure to pass moral judgment" about the failings of others itself constitutes such a breach -- then how are you going to behave around others? You need travel no farther than certain other Objectivist blogs and websites to see the answer, in all its ugly excess. Teenagers, who tend to feel angry, alienated, and isolated to begin with, are especially susceptible to such messages, whether explicit or subliminal. My own reading of Rand's works began in my teens, and I vividly recall the feelings of anger and self-righteousness that grew toward misanthropic rage as I absorbed, uncritically, the notions I've outlined above. Let me EMPHASIZE that these unfortunate messages came as a "package-deal" along with a host of priceless, unrepeatable values: Rand's new conception of human heroism, morality, and idealism; her stunning answers to a host of philosophical questions that had tormented me since childhood; her extraordinary psychological insights, which helped me turn my life around; her invaluable training in critical thinking; her integrations of ideas that spanned vast, previously unrelated areas of knowledge; her introductions to new facts, issues, and fields of study that I had never dreamed of exploring; her ingenious stories and unprecedented characters, which caused me to laugh and weep and cheer, and which will remain burned into my consciousness to my dying day; and her providing me with an indispensable intellectual basis for my entire subsequent career as a writer. My debts to Ayn Rand are beyond any measure. So, do I therefore fault her for not being the perfect teacher or exemplar, or for imparting to me the occasional error or unfortunate attitude, which caused me later grief? Hell, no. My mind and character were not her moral responsibility. She lived her own life and communicated her philosophy as well and honorably as she could -- and that was far, far better than almost anyone I am aware of or could even imagine. And, did the tremendous values that I obtained from Ayn Rand more than offset any prices I paid by simultaneously absorbing the errors I described above? Hell, yes. I will always treasure what I've gained from Ayn Rand; and if she ever led me astray, she also gave me the compass and the courage to chart my own path home. All in all, I bear a debt of gratitude to her that could never be repaid. Does that answer your questions?

Like despots, dogmatists who run groups maintain member loyalty and cohesion only by uniting followers against some outside "enemy." Theirs is a negative unity, a unity based on hatred expressed against heretics, traitors, etc. As long as they can whip up a frenzy of denunciations and rage against some external "evil," they can hold together something of a following. But observe what happens whenever those hated "enemies" leave their immediate vicinity. Then the dogmatists are left without a unifying focus. Now, you'd think that Objectivism itself would serve as that unifying force, but it really isn't -- because their individual interpretations of "Objectivism" vary so widely. Witness the current interpretive battles in ARI ranks over the theories of Tracinski vs. Peikoff, and how people are picking sides. Just add this current rite of purification to a long list of previous purges (examples provided upon request). So, in the absence of the unifying enemy, they are suddenly left with this naked reality: They are a bunch of people who really don't have much in common except a passion for issuing denunciations and repudiations -- because indulging that passion reassures them that they are "moral." Without that hated enemy, where can they now exercise that passion...except against each other? Friends, I have witnessed this phenomenon in Objectivist circles for decades. Some of you may recall that many moons ago, I (safely) predicted that if decent people simply stopped showing up to argue with the publishers of those ugly websites and blogs, they would no longer present "enemies" against which the Hsiehs, Valliants, Perigos, et al., could long remain united, either. And that our absences would then force those carnivores to turn on each other. And so they have. My god, I should have taken wagers, and made a lot of money. We're now witnessing the inevitable process of self-cannibalization among these Running Dog(matist)s of Capitalism, as each member of the pack snarls and snaps at the other, and eventually is driven off to an isolated doghouse to lick his/her wounds. Perigo, for example, has just announced that he's had to "postpone" his next conference after only 6, count 'em, 6 people registered. With characteristically insufferable bravado, he now tries to twist the fact that he's universally and justifiably despised into evidence of his virtue: Ah, they all hate me because I won't compromise my principles! he tells himself, and the shrinking ranks of maschosists still hanging around on his site. Of course! That has to be it -- right? Meanwhile, ARI, now facing the disquieting spectacle of its most productive, visible, and publicly respected writer openly questioning idiotic Peikovian dogmas, has purged the blasphemer from its midst, giving their own snarling pack animals yet a new "enemy" du jour around whom to unite in a feeding frenzy. But clearly, given the sympathy expressed for Tracinski on unofficial ARI-camp blogs, he won't be the last to be shown the door in coming months; just wait and see. Folks, it's all so...OLD. And thus predictable. Rand said that the nature of an entity determines what it will do. Even a cursory familiarity with the nature of self-righteous dogmatists will make entirely intelligible -- and predictable -- what they will do. But Rand also said that the irrational, left to their own devices, were doomed: they must feed off rational hosts in order to exist. Moral: The single worst thing you can do with such predators is to enter their fever swamps and directly engage them, thus granting them the gift of an external enemy against whom to remain united. On the other hand, the single smartest thing you can do to thwart such irrationalists is to simply leave them alone to cannibalize each other. That's the predictable nature of these beasts; and the current bloodletting we see going on in their cages eloquently demonstrates my case.

Amen, Jim. That's what sensible people do. But not people for whom associations and disassociations have been twisted into a means of acquiring, or demonstrating, their personal moral stature.

The perfectly predictable piling-on begins. Before another week is out, the ARIans will have all smugly convinced themselves that Tracinski was purged for being an Islamist sympathizer. Or perhaps even WORSE: a TAS sympathizer!

Chris, while it would be nice if this happened, I don't expect it to. Apart from any disagreements he may have with us, Tracinski would immediately be smeared by ARI for any association with us, which, from his standpoint, would only divert attention from the real issues underlying his purge. As it stands now, in order to justify its unconscionable actions against him, ARI has to defend Peikoff's idiotic views of the recent election, and his rationalistic interpretation of how ideas move history -- both of which Tracinski has challenged, and which led to this split. TAS has not been any factor in that dispute, and I'd wager that Tracinski, being a smart man, would prefer to keep it that way. TAS maintains an "open-door policy" toward fellow Objectivists, but whether a given individual cares to walk through it is entirely up to him. Regardless of his view of us, I respect Tracinski for his courage and integrity in sticking by his guns despite the great criticism and pressure from long-time associates and friends. As a writer and editor, I also admire his professionalism and skill as a journalist.