william.scherk

Luckily, the non-Objectivists outnumber the Objectivists here at Objectivist Living. Seriously, though, the repellent altruism Objectivists abhor is a compulsive, mandated, coerced policy of putting other peoples' interests ahead of one's own, always and ever. Rand puts it to us that altruism is a principle: "What is the moral code of altruism? The basic principle of altruism is that man has no right to exist for his own sake, that service to others is the only justification of his existence, and that self-sacrifice is his highest moral duty, virtue, and value.'' This is all or nothing, as stated. Elsewhere the principle is stated as baldly: "The issue is whether the need of others is the first mortgage on your life and the moral purpose of your existence.'' On the Atlas Society site, Will Thomas further explicates the devilry that is altruism. [A]ltruism is the doctrine of self-sacrifice, of destroying oneself and one's values for the sake of others. But sometimes scholars and popular writers use the word "altruism" to mean both self-sacrifice and benevolent, non-predatory behavior. So be careful when reading about evolutionary psychology to understand what this word means to the author. David Kelley writes about the policy of altruism in the essay "Altruism and Capitalism": What exactly does the term "altruism" mean? On the one hand, it can mean nothing more than kindness or common courtesy. On the other hand, it can mean the complete submersion of the self in a larger social whole. This was the meaning Auguste Comte intended when he coined the term. Leonard Peikoff writes another definition of altruism: Those who reject the principle of selfishness will find in the history of ethics two main alternatives. One is the primordial and medieval theory that man should sacrifice himself to the supernatural. The second is the theory that man should sacrifice himself for the sake of other men. The second is known as "altruism," which is not a synonym for kindness, generosity, or good will, but the doctrine that man should place others above self as the fundamental rule of life. So, from this sample I can induce a common definition -- altruism is a doctrine, altruism means complete submersion of self in a social whole, altruism means humans must sacrifice themselves for other persons, a doctrinal requirement or duty pledging that other persons must be placed above your self, to the point of your own destruction. So it is almost easy to see how a diehard could reject any and all studies of biological altruism: it is an evil human doctrine, policy or theory, imposed by force, persuasion and shame -- by definition it cannot be a biological behaviour. This, of course, leads to problems for cross-disciplinary communication. -- it seems to me that biologists study the behaviour of altruism; they can hardly study the doctrines and principles with their tools of genetics and the Dictator Game. There doesn't appear to be any overlap between an ugly, evil, destructive doctrine -- and a suite of behaviours that is heritable -- to a mind that has foreclosed the meanings. This is where I can have a little sympathy for the hardline altruist-hating Objectivist who rejects 'altruism research' such as the studies I have noted earlier . . . "they are not studying altruism. That's not altruism. That's not what Rand, Peikoff and Kelley mean by altruism!" So, if the Objectivists are correct, the study of vasospressin receptors and their genetic variability -- even if such study proves that lengthy promoter regions on the genes map exactly to an increase in pro-social, generous, affiliative behaviour, to the granting of real dollars in the Dictator Game, even if such genetic facts correlate strongly to self-report measures of altruism 'other-directed' behaviour, even if this simple, well-conserved bit of genetic information seems a key to some puzzling behaviours . . . . . . a hardcore Objectivist may have no interest in the results of the research because of the word (indeed, even softcore Objectivists may take issue with the word, and make careful distinction between ethics and urges, as here: "I find it horrible that altruism is the term these researchers used rather than something like "pro-species urge." They muddy the understanding of the study that way. A biological urge [or reaction] is not a chosen ethics."). It's not altruism! Yarggggh! Stop the scientists calling it altruism! Yaaarghh! Tell that Dawkins and that Hamilton and Smith and Gintis and those other miscreants that they are all wrong and stupid and bad with words! Tell Google to stop giving two million hits on 'altruism research'! Ayn Rand has done all the altruism research the earth will ever need, you misfits and fools! ______________________________________ So, okay, according to the dicta of O, whatever is being studied is not Altruism. Okay. But what is it, then, that is described? What is it -- the behaviour that has been correlated to the receptor genes? What is the meaning of co-operative, other-informed, considerate, affiliative behaviour if these kinds of behaviour can actually be found in varying degrees according to the strength/length of promoter genes? What does it say about human nature if a neuropeptide can so dramatically influence behaviour? In other words, are the suggestive findings to be rejected because some people use the word altruism in a way that frets the Objectivist purist? Will not Objectivist thinkers give a good hard look at the data and its implications for the theory of human nature attributed to Rand? That distinction isn't always so clear-cut, however. Sometimes people behave altruistically in decisions that take a split second, more or less automatically, when there is no time for conscious deliberation. For example a mother who in an emergency saves her child at the cost of her own life or the soldier who throws himself on a live grenade to save his comrades. We should not ignore our biological heritage when analyzing such behavior. I agree with Dragonfly, of course -- if we ignore our biological heritage, then we are hardly studying ourselves with any rigour. I also see that an Objectivist would make the careful distinction that the 'automated value choice' of a parent saving a child is an ethical decision made in terms of the dear value to the parent. What it doesn't explain are moving, inexplicable rescues of strangers. What an automated ethical choice doesn't explain is how a blast of oxytocin or vasopressin up the nasal passages can engender trust, affiliation, pair-bonding, and it appears, generosity -- without any value choice machinery intervening. What an automated ethical choice doesn't explain is how genetic differences can render some of us autistic, disempathetic, mistrustful, and, dare I say it -- in tune with the wishes and needs of other people with whom we share the world.

Altruism in biology is no more altruism than Homo floresiensis is a Hobbit. It's a mistake to draw serious conclusions from lose and trendy language, even if the speakers are biologists. I can't claim to understand Michael's thoughts at the moment, but look forward to some lucid expositions of the species/individual survival mechanishm/mind comments. With altruism, Ted, and its "proper" meaning -- I have found that evolutionary biology studies altruistic behaviour because at first glance it doesn't make evolutionary sense. If the drive of the organism is to survive and reproduce, why would any organism make a habit of sacrificing any of its own success at life for the success of another? Darwin, in the Descent of Man, was clearly puzzled by altruistic behaviour in light of natural selection, believing that any such behaviour, if heritable, would not likely survive in societies -- such supposedly noble, other-directed behaviour he thought would die out over time, as its primary actors could not pass on an altruistic inheritance in the same numbers as other more purely selfish behaviours. This remains the puzzle, with solutions ranging from group selection to kin selection to reciprocal altruism . . . to the current research into the neurology of altruism, and the varied studies linked to in my post above. I suggest you read the useful paper by Ebstein et al, which covers their own work with the AVPR1a receptor, and also offers a good overview of recent work. What I get out of this paper is a strong sense that genetic differences under study undergird a whole suite of pro-social, generous, benevolent, cooperative behaviour -- it can certainly be argued that the suite of behaviours is not altruism at all, but I don't think that undermines the significance or interest in the work. Your mileage may vary, of course, but I would be very interested in your comments on Ebstein et al as well as the whole notion that the Dictator Game concerns 'altruism' in any way. I am sure you will find a lot of interest in the Ebstein paper, since it covers both the vasopressin receptor as well as oxytocin receptors, and more intriguingly, reports on associations between the two neuropeptides and autism, musical memory, dance (!) and so on. If the vasopressin receptor gene polymorphisms don't actually correlate with 'true' altruism, we can at least argue about the force of genetics on so-called pro-social behaviour. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has some interesting statements on biological altruism, somethat seem to contradict Ted's understanding of loose and sloppy terminology -- I recommend this page to OL readers for a careful survey of the general problems and history of the altruism in biology, and so you can see where Ted's antipathy to biological research on 'autism' may be found: In evolutionary biology, an organism is said to behave altruistically when its behaviour benefits other organisms, at a cost to itself. The costs and benefits are measured in terms of reproductive fitness, or expected number of offspring. So by behaving altruistically, an organism reduces the number of offspring it is likely to produce itself, but boosts the number that other organisms are likely to produce. This biological notion of altruism is not identical to the everyday concept. In everyday parlance, an action would only be called ‘altruistic’ if it was done with the conscious intention of helping another. But in the biological sense there is no such requirement.

Forgive me, but I don't know what you are referring to. Do you mean the AVPR1a polymorphism suggesting a heritable 'altruism'? If so, what do you think of the work that transformed the polygamous voles into nice mates? I am guessing that you suggest 80% of individual values/behaviour are without significant input from genetics or are not heritable at all, and that species' values/behaviours are heritable to the rate of 20%. This begs the question of what you mean by individual/species values and behaviour, and how one would differentiate between particular values/behaviours. I am not quite sure what you mean by thinking biologically (as opposed to culturally, perhaps?), and also don't know what part of your thinking is corroborated by my post . . . sorry to be so thick and lost. Ummm, I am extremely thick and lost now. What testing of what hypothesis? I am intensely interested in the issues and research I remarked upon in the lead post. If you want to discuss with me, that would be great; please add some specificity to your comments when you get some time.

The Emperor of SOLO has just reported from James Valliant. James has had a relapse of his illness, and hasn't heard back yet from the Archives on his request to Britting.

The science blogs have been full of links to a new study of possible genetic input into trust and cooperative behaviours -- in which heritable variations in vasopressin receptors are posited to strongly influence that behaviour. (Thanks to the departed George Donnelly for his followup to MSK's posts referencing Wayne Dyer -- my hunt for relevant information began with his useful post of June 13 this year) The hormone/neurotransmitter vasopressin and its receptors are best illustrated in differences between the monogamous prairie vole and its close relative the montane vole (the prairie rodent is monogamous, the montane vole not). The hormone is believed to play a part in 'communication, aggression, sexual behavior, and social memory.' "In monogamous species, such as the prairie vole, vasopressin facilitates affiliation, pairbonding, and paternal care, whereas in the closely related montane vole, which is polygamous, vasopressin fails to influence social behavior." -- from the 1999 ScienceDaily story that features the breakthrough receptor research -- a transgenic vole whose pair-bonding behaviour was transformed by genetic manipulation. The research that was engendered by the vole experiments has ramified hugely, involving vasopressin receptors and aggression, trust, cooperation, and even altruism.** In the recent work, the standard socio-economic experiment "the dictator game" has been married with tests of genes responsible for vasopressin receptors. For those interested in the intersection of altruism/genetic research, some intriguing findings -- below is the abstract to the study which just appeared in the Public Library of Science (full text here): Heritability of cooperative behavior in the trust game Although laboratory experiments document cooperative behavior in humans, little is known about the extent to which individual differences in cooperativeness result from genetic and environmental variation. In this article, we report the results of two independently conceived and executed studies of monozygotic and dizygotic twins, one in Sweden and one in the United States. The results from these studies suggest that humans are endowed with genetic variation that influences the decision to invest, and to reciprocate investment, in the classic trust game. Based on these findings, we urge social scientists to take seriously the idea that differences in peer and parental socialization are not the only forces that influence variation in cooperative behavior. Strangely (or not so strangely) there is already a $99.00 genetic test offered to sort out the ruthless, selfish suitor from the more benevolent one: Ruthlessness/bonding gene test You will receive 1 mouth swab and collection tube per test, in a return package, along with specific instructions on how to collect the samples. Ask your fiancée, significant other, business partner and/or elected representative to get these genetic tests done as soon as possible. This is for informational purposes only and is not a medical diagnosis. Consult with your doctor. Researchers theorized that the AVPR1a linked to pro-social and anti-social behavior in prairie voles might be a factor in human behavior. They discovered that certain genotypes in the promoter region of the AVPR1a gene corresponded with "Benevolent behavior" and "Universalistic behavior" on various personality tests and that those same genotypes corresponded to altruistic behavior in a game they called "the dictator game". These results were published in the journal Genes, Brain and Behavior. I am rather skeptical that this test will deliver reliable match-making information, but the whole suite of research I link to is a buffet for thought about the Objectivish bugaboos of altruism, social metaphysics and selfishness . . . _______________________________ ** for a flavour of the ramifications, check out the reference list accompanying the paper Neural Substrates of Decision-making in Economic Games.

You are mistaken. Light exasperation is more accurate. I get tired of discussing things that make no sense because someone wants to bash another. I have no problem with real reasons. I do have a problem with made up reasons, forced logic, and the competitive approach to rhetoric. Fair enough. Thanks for clearing that up. I still have a couple of questions that pertain to your comments on 'elementary grammar.' I am assuming you read up on dicto simpliciter . . . and that you grant my, Ellen's and Roger's point that in some cases, the present tense of to be denotes a "state of nature."

This is all pretty elementary, no? Only on an Objectivist forum is it possible to debate whether the present tense is timeless or not. Did you mean there to be a sneering undertone to your remarks, Michael? I detect one, or infer one, and hope I am mistaken. It adds an ugly note to your efforts to make your interpretation stand, expecially in the context of the dangers of relying upon inductive reasoning for valid generalizations, timeless conclusions. I believe it is fair to say that the present tense serves to indicate the now, as you state. It also serves to indicate rules of nature, or the way the world is (or as noted above, a widespread truth). Water is wet. Zinc is white. Handsome is as handsome does. Boors are unwelcome at the Queen's table. It's funny that you would insist upon a narrow rule reading of 'present tense' to clip the wings of your interlocutors. Context is important. Context is always important. Interlocutors are important. Today and in the future. I hope that you will do a simple Google search on the term dicto simpliciter. This is a type of fallacy. I would explain it by pointing to this phrase: "The present tense refers only to the present." There are exceptions. Ellen has pointed out an exception. Instead of getting your back up, you might acknowledge the exception.

I've read and re-read this thread three times, in an effort to salve my ignorance and understand the positions at issue. I must commend Ba'al for several statements that I both understand and accept as reasonable: Induction is a practical way of producing general statements from a finite set of instances. The generalization might be true or it might be false. We learn through induction. We formulate rules that guide our future behavior. When the rule does not always work we modify. So induction plus learning through failure is how we progress. Induction is a heuristic for making generalizations from specific instances. It is NOT a generally valid mode of inference. There is no guarantee that generalizations that flow from instances by induction will be true for all times, places and conditions. What I see as the lesson of the so-called problem of induction is beware! Beware fallacies of faulty and sloppy inductive reasoning. Beware arguments that seem to use logical induction to reach reasonable conclusions, but are actually hasty generalizations, arguments by analogy, or other deformities of reason. Beware accepting a conclusion about an entire class or type of thing/events -- when the basis for the conclusion is small or unrepresentative in relation to the entire class. In any case, what the hell do I know? Here's a funny thing -- David Harriman, accepted as genius by Leonard Peikoff, has an article at the Objective Standard (subscribers only for full text). It's called Induction and Experimental Method. On the OS page he writes that it is "adapted from a chapter of my book in progress, 'Induction in Physics and Philosophy.'" He also notes that the book in progress is "based on Leonard Peikoff’s lecture course of the same title." Now, what I want to know is if this book will ever make it to print. A corollary question: if Peikoff 'solved' the so-called problem of induction, what the hell is the issue with putting his solution in print? At least a thread like this one (and the earlier OL threads touching on induction) could reference some text-based information. Otherwise the whole Objectivist solution seems to be something reserved only for acolytes and true believers in the oral tradition. How can the rest of the world seriously engage an argument that is available only on CD-ROM or cassette tapes? I just cannot get my head around the persistence of the oral/aural tradition. It hobbles Objectivism and leaves the Objectivist rack in the library a fairly scanty stretch of material.

I have my fingers crossed that Zeus will send down a thunderbolt, flinging open the bronze gates to the Caverns of Wisdom. But information on the Archives' web site suggests that if such a consultation is to happen, it will take place later on, should Zeus or Valliant intervene successfully with the Cyclopeans. Access Our access policy statement is available for the researcher. At present, due to preservation tasks, physical access to the Archives is limited to the Ayn Rand Institute staff and affiliates. However, research inquiries from university-affiliated graduate students and scholars are encouraged and will be accommodated whenever possible. For information on its future opening date, please consult the News & Announcements section for updates. The current focus of the Archives is a major preservation project that has been in development for several years: the Ayn Rand Papers Conversion Project. _________________________ NOTE: Due to the conversion project, the Archives is currently unavailable to researchers. Completion of the project is expected before the end of 2008.

Yes, the PARC/Valliant threads do offer at least the simulacra of discussion -- meaning a couple or more positions in jostling discord. SOLO's main attractions lately seem to be a kind of plangent angry whining bitchiness on all kinds of subjects, with zero focus or editorial line beyond a general bitter distemper. "Objectivism hasn't swept the world! And it's because of the likes of you, William Nevin, soft-cock appeasing hypocrite." I have no idea why Lindsay Perigo finds it necessary to bitch out people who are his supporters. If they don't do the pitchfork and boiling oil choreography to his prescription, they become cowards and traitors or are otherwise reviled. As a marketing tool, or a means of increasing participation, it seems unwise. But, such is the challenge of maintaining and extending a vast Empire.

Yeah, nobody cares except those who care. And nobody takes the book seriously except for those who take the book seriously. But seriously, fans of own-goal moments in Objectivism do have Lindsay Perigo's last petulant squall of outrage, this time directed to Bill Nevin: "But in my book, Mr. Nevin, you're a hypocrite, an appeaser and a two-faced soft-cock." What is hilarious about the outburst is that Nevin had just popped in with encouragement and praise for James Valliant (seems Mr Nevin has had gas in his bloodstream for a good long while over the subject of TheBrandens™). Perhaps it was the wee tinkle of approbation for the Atlas Society that kicked Perigo into fifth gear. There are hardly any serious readers/responders left at SOLO, so I don't see why the Emperor of SOLO has to be such a snarky, bilious bitch to Nevin.

One last proof that we do see atoms, or, okay, pairs of atoms here. Look at a cloud of of chlorine gas in a chemical flask under a hood. What is the green stuff that you see, if not atoms of Chlorine?We are getting pretty danged close to imaging/'feeling' the atom with atomic force microscopy (see a cool story from Science Daily, from which the illustration comes). For full size images from atomic force microscopy -- including subatomic structures within single atoms, see an excellent blog entry by Mike Wendman, a 'microfab engineer.'

That Altruism does sound like a very bad person, a bad liar full of vice . . . I don't think I like him as presented. I am acquainted with his cousins, though, and they are fine people. There's a lot of them, I think. Kindness and Charity, Cooperation, Reciprocity, Benevolence -- you likely have met them, Ba'al. All fairly warm folk who care about other people. They even invite old cranky lying vice-ridden Altruism to their family picnics. The creepiest two things about cousin Al are that he doesn't expect back from his ugly altruistic acts, but he leaves a distateful impression, like a bathtub ring, that we are obliged to look out for one another. When he puts himself out, he doesn't actually demand a quid pro quo. It's so non-objectivish. He just gives a creepy altruist smile, and says, 'but you're family.' Luckily the family picnics happen but once a year. There are some great moments in Temple Grandin's works where she speaks of her puzzlement with love. She thinks the things she builds for the welfare of hogs and cattle, the way she reacts to them, has some kind of relation to human love. In some ways she links herself to the animals as a similar consciousness (Dr Grandin is autistic). Her brand of benevolence applies mostly to the feedlot/slaughterhouse, but has provided her with professional acclaim and personal satisfaction. We won't call what she does altruist, since altruism is bad, very bad, but I invite readers to have a gander on her discussion of altruism** (from a blog entry at Strange Mercy that features some passages from her book Thinking in Pictures). The hardest part about killing off old evil Altruism is that he is in every big family, and appears to arise in every generation, unbidden and of dubious value, like a fungus on a lawn. I always think of his creepy smile when I am at Arlington, or when I think of a flag-draped coffin -- that dreadful implication of service for others, and sacrifice and other things altruistic too ugly to be named. **[these excerpts can be read in full context in the first chapter, Autism and Visual Thought, which you may have already grokked, Ba'al. If not interesting for her odd notions of altruism, for her evocation of the way her mind works.] "I think with the primary sensory based subconscious areas of the brain. ... since I think with the subconscious, repression does not occur and denial is impossible. ... My memory is not automatic. ... However, I can search through old memories of really bad events, such as being fired from a job, with no emotion. At the time I was fired I cried for two days." "... When I read that the Olympic stadium and the main library in Sarajevo had been destroyed, I wept. ... I become very upset and emotional when I think about the loss of knowledge and culture, and I am unable to write about this without crying. ... I don't know what it is like to hate somebody so much that you would want to destroy their culture and civilization." "... I believe that if souls exist in humans, they also exist in animals, because the basic structure of the brain is the same. ... However, there is one thing that completely separates humans from animals. ... it is long-term altruism. During a famine in Russia ... scientists guarded the seed bank of plant genetics so that future generations would have the benefits of genetic diversity in food crops. For the benefit of others, they allowed themselves to starve to death in a lab filled with grain. No animal would do this. Altruism exists in animals, but not to this degree." "I do not believe that my profession is morally wrong. ... I do feel very strongly about treating animals humanely and with respect... the slaughter plant is much gentler than nature. Animals in the wild die from starvation, predators, or exposure. ... Unfortunately, most people never observe the natural cycle of living and death. They do not realize that for one living thing to survive, another living thing must die." "... People feed, shelter, and breed cattle and hogs, and in return the animals provide food and clothing. We must never abuse them, because that would break the ancient contract. We owe it to the animals to give them decent living conditions and a painless death." "... I realized there can be a conflict between feeling and doing. Zen meditators may be able to achieve the perfect state of oneness with the universe, but they do not bring about reform and change in the world around them." "I believe that the place where an animal dies is a sacred one." "When I was in high school, I received a brochure from a cattle chute company that said, 'thoughts with no price tags.' "Men will wrangle for religion, write for it, fight for it, die for it, anything but live for it." I never forgot that quote."

A quark isn't a muon, a muon is one of the leptons, like the electron. Quarks form hadrons, particles with strong interaction, like the proton and the neutron. Thanks for the correction!

They have. The say "complexity" is the fundamental driving force in emergence. Complexity is the cause of new forms in this vew, not a description of them. They don't use this language, but that's the gist. We can probably get closer to the issues that in contention by finding an instance, I figger. I could trying to find one of these bogus kinds of argument -- so we call all have a slash at it. It would be fun for everyone, dontcha think? Here's what I mean: Let's discard the phrase 'emergent people' and use something more neutral like 'some theorists' -- and then recast the idea. Some theories of emergence lack details on the process and seem to explain with a wave of the hand; I want to know the ins and outs of how an emergent property or attribrute or whatever actually comes into existence. For example, if consciousness is an emergent property, how do I know that theorists aren't just coming up with an empty word? I don't want emergence as a magic wand -- I want meat on them bones. I would happily start off a path to find the evidence that gives warrant to the idea. Not simple, not easy, but I think it would be worth it. Another idea that seems to emerge from your last week of posts answering mine is that Big Bang theory doesn't satisfy your own personal questions about the universe (I am wondering if you are unsatisfied with current explanations of the origin of life). Another: top/down, simple/complex, content/form, components/systems, little thingies used for alignment/patterns, reductionist parts/holons . . . Anyhow, we can have a look at the awful emergence theorists if you like, although your raising them so looks like a tu quoque fallacy (meaning, I had addressed what I thought were grave shortcomings with Wilberian/Sheldrakian warpings of 'holon.' That was my 'give me meat' plaint. Now, if someone were to say, "Well, the emergence people do the same dang thing," it doesn't actually address the argument I have made). Yes, well, I will do my part since you are too busy at the moment. I will look at some scientific stuff and get some quotes. I'll try to find some work where 'emergence,' systems, form, patterns come into play, and then I will have to guess which instances might illustrate your contentions. Could be a while. I don't care for this term "heuristic." Why not just say speculation? Well, the two terms don't mean the same thing, for one. What don't you care for about the term. Instead of using speculation, how about '"rules of thumb", educated guesses, intuitive judgments or simply common sense' [from Wikipedia]? Heuristic doesn't mean speculation. Secondly, a separable 'morphic field' -- I don't know if your answer means you listened to the talk I cited between Wilber and Sheldrake. Indeed, the two are in harmony. The morphic field is used muchly by Wilber to explain the workings of holons. I am guessing, but I think this is the part of Wilber that you don't like, along with his ignorance of evolution, and his notion of sentient quarks and other hootingly stupid assumptions of this four quadrants model. I think Ellen has provided yeoman service for all those here who are interested in how the 'holon' has grown and morphed over the years. I do also think you will agree that 'holon' is an excellent type of heuristic, a helpful nudge to consider reality as mutually-imbricated systems. Her examples of S-R dogmas in psychology as something Koestler meant to counter with a holonic view give expression to its recent historic utility. As well, the example Koestler gave of morphogenetic fields as instance of a holon was excellent (and that's why I dragged in the cat of evo-devo, since the holons in question under its purview are multiple). So, I hope you don't get me wrong. Holon is a fine word. It's the extension of the term into pixie world that I am concerned with. I assume that you too don't believe in pixies and you don't like the religious undergirding of Wilber's wilder proclamations -- so it is concerning that you don't acknowledge the particular faults in his philosophy that have been brought forward in this thread and in the Dawkins thread. You gotta admit that at times Wilber is a bit of a wackaloon. And I would hope you understand that he has had zero influence on scientists. I'm taking a wild guess here, and so correct me if I am wrong, but it's not the term you don't care for, but its misuse, maybe the use to which it is put by Sheldrake. Fair enough. Did you want to sketch up a statement of that axiom? Well, we will wait for your sketch of the axiom to better understand your greater position, then, but I understand you to be saying that you reject Sheldrake's morphic fields. Well, that's one way of looking at it. For me, the interesting thing, and one which I do not understand, are the how and when and the whither of the particles. I know enough of the gross features of physical theory to know that particles form the world of the elements, and that some particles are not bound in an element (light). I don't understand why the electron is a lepton and a quark is a muon, and I certainly don't understand what the heck a photon is, but I recognize that atomic energy has resulted from somebody's understanding of the forces and features of the atom. And I further understand that chemistry has teased out some mysteries of the whys and the whithers of how elements combine. It does strike me that the workers who have constructed our understanding and application of elements, elementary forces, and chemistry don't necessarily use the word holon. But the other funny thing is that they still get the work done, holonically. I mean, a chemist understands that he is dealing with parts/wholes and a molecular biologist deals with them too. The geneticists by virtue of their field are forced to think in terms of part/whole, as are varied fields subsumed under the headings of biology. Beyond that, of course, more . . . And another striking thing to me is that there seems to be a growing consilience of the varied workers' products. Indeed the chemist relies upon the physics implicated in his work, and the biologist must pay head to the chemist. And so on across the fields. The work converges and elaborates in many directions, incorporating the findings of related fields from varied positions in the landscape of inquiry. One might say, "biology is a holon, chemistry is a holon, physics is a holon, genetics is a holon, evolutionary theory is a holon." Dynamic, mutually-dependent, separable but still implicated in a whole. That is the grand multidimensional enterprise that astounds me and fills me with awe. Certainly there are mysteries, deep and dark mysteries. As you speak elsewhere with disdain of Big Bang theory, the singularity, I don't see a lot to scoff at. I understand that we can't spell out all the particulars and ramifications fully, but that so much evidence converges from so many points, that the universe has expanded from what seems in retrospect to have been a single point, that there was a massive explosion that continues to ripple outward, that there are posited things like dark energy and dark matter . . . all of this fills me with awe and wonder. Not only that we have in my lifetime come to discover and integrate so much, but at the very mystery of it all. We don't know it all. We may never know it all. What a thrill that we have come so close. Most of the scientific literature I have read about it refers to a "singularity." That term is mostly used in cosmology, but the meaning is always clear in the works I have read. The all encompassing singularity is our ancestor according to this "heuristic." I thought you were familiar with this. Well, sure, but remember the phrase I didn't understand: "all the variety of forms in the universe ultimately emerged from one tiny thing" (as view of some emergence theorists). My question was, who? Now you have answered the question, sort of, telling me it's Them, as in 'They have. They say "complexity" is the fundamental driving force in emergence.' And then you say, now you go look for evidence of Them, William. And I will, though I doubt I will find anyone saying The Singularity is Our Ancestor.

... I said nothing about emergence, let alone 'emergence people,' and I have no idea who you mean . . . "Emergence people" is merely a layman's way of saying people who think emergence is the sole cause of form on an ontological level—that all the variety of forms in the universe ultimately emerged from one tiny thing whose nature is unknown, so to speak.Hmmm. There are a number of ideas to unpack here. First, establish the reference to "that kind of thinking." What was removed from the 'emergence people' line was this phrase upon which your remarks stand: "I find the whole concept of emergence to "imply a force, not merely a pattern. The only difference between . . . " See, I was talking about the difference between a heuristic and a reification. You then appeared to see a difference between 'emergence people's thinking and Ken Wilber's. And where I further get caught in the net is where your remarks seem to imply that some unnamed people have stopped using 'emergence' as a heuristic, and reified it into an independent actor. Perhaps you have misinterpreted emergence, or made some illicit inferences. That is why it would help if you could dig up some of these people so we can see if you have fairly characterized their thinking. Anyway, on to parse the rest . . . Form on an ontological level. Emergence posits a 'force from the bottom.' Emergence is the sole cause of form (ontological). Some people think emergence is the sole cause of form. I can't imagine who these people are, or where they say such things. And I don't know where the force-from-bottom people conflict with Wilber's force-from-top. If I recall correctly, you were commenting on my qualification that holon is (in Wilber's cosmology) reified into a thing in and of itself -- "not merely as a pattern observed, but as an ineffable nudger of ever-present reality along proper grooves." That is the force of the holon where I take issue -- existing independently of the part/whole organism. The point I further made, Michael that with Wilber the holon becomes a separable 'morphic field' not merely a heuristic. I don't mean to be repetitive but it is important for me to lay out the points I put under discussion. Again, Wilber/Sheldrake agree on morphic fields, that this is how a separable 'force' builds holons. Not as a heuristic tool or an abstraction, as with Koestler and evo-devo, but as a thing in itself -- a field, a force, energy and information. Thus my objections to Wilberian/Sheldrakian extensions of holon . . . here's Wilber describing what I reject: Note that, in my view, these various fields include not only morphic or morphogenetic fields, as described by Sheldrake, but also various energy fields (gross energy, subtle energy, and causal energy, as we will see in Excerpt D, "Subtle Energy"--where I will further suggest that the various morphic fields are actually subtle energy fields. [link] !!! As for all forms having emerged from one tiny thing . . . what one tiny thing? If some people say that all forms emerged from one tiny thing, who are they? And if they think that the unnamed one tiny thing has an unknown nature, again, I want to see this laid out somewhere. I want to find out where an ineffable, extrinsic force is assumed to guide development -- in the thinking of the 'emergence people.'

I reject this too, just as I would reject (to paraphrase) that the nature of subparticles is something apart in another realm from the subparticles themselves, existing timelessly, and exerting an independent force as "will to emerge and bind or repel" once it attaches to them or something like that. Fair enough, and glad to hear it! I agree with this in general terms . . . so, for example, a whole system like a embodied mind/brain can cause things to happen, like for example changes in electrical potential in neurons. I don't recognize the claim "something comes from nothing" in relation to 'awareness.' Who has made this claim -- that awareness (in living things) has no relation to the inanimate matter that engendered it? Is this from the 'emergence people'? Using a very 'primitive,' simple form of life as an example, is there a continuum of 'awareness' to your mind? Does it do violence to your argument to use the primitive awareness of a bacteria as an illustration, or need we move up in terms of complexity to 'self-conscious awareness' in primates? Perhaps you could expand on your meaning of 'awareness' or let us know if you mean consciousness. I mention this distinction only because it could well be argued that simple animal life forms have developed an 'awareness' by way of neurons (I am thinking of the studies in Aplysia by Kandel) and it seems to me that this is far from miraculous in the sense of otherworldly.

Confusion reigns. Roger, I'm not understanding how you got that description of my comment about "morphogenetic [not "morphic"] fields" as used in a section I posted from The Ghost in the Machine He got that from me, in my misreading: The 'morphogenetic field,' noted by Ellen, is an abstraction of the constraints of development -- it is not the constraints itself. It is a mathematical rendering of the constraints, a map or graph. Do you follow that distinction? Reading that now it seems translated to Slavonic and back. There are morphogenetic field models, and graphical representations, I understand, but I conflated them with the basic biological concept which does contain the concrete cells/area. The distinction I meant to make was between a field with actors (in this case cells) and a reified notion where the field itself is the actor (as in Sheldrake's wacky notion of something extrinsic). I should have underlined that, and not taken the 'rendering' idea so far. Thanks for picking up the error, Ellen, and for the extensive posts above. Sheldrake says, "Most biologists still regard morphogenetic fields simply as a way of thinking about morphogenesis rather than something that really exists." [see note four on Wiki's 'morphic resonance' page] Here is vintage Sheldrake to help us see what a morphogenetic field is not (from a great post at Pharyngula which does a good job of explaining the distinction: The fields organizing the activity of the nervous system are likewise inherited through morphic resonance, conveying a collective, instinctive memory. Each individual both draws upon and contributes to the collective memory of the species. This means that new patterns of behaviour can spread more rapidly than would otherwise be possible. For example, if rats of a particular breed learn a new trick in Harvard, then rats of that breed should be able to learn the same trick faster all over the world, say in Edinburgh and Melbourne. There is already evidence from laboratory experiments (discussed in A NEW SCIENCE OF LIFE) that this actually happens. The resonance of a brain with its own past states also helps to explain the memories of individual animals and humans. There is no need for all memories to be "stored" inside the brain.

Okay. You assert that there are two ways of looking at all things, and that these two ways reflect the way things are built. I must admit I don't understand this fully. If we are speaking of "building the universe," and there are two ways of looking at this building, one from the top and one from the bottom, I can't immediately think of an example to clearly illustrate the assertion with regard to the universe. We'll agree that the study of the universe and its building is called cosmology, then -- is there a top-down cosmology and a bottom-up cosmology, to your mind? Can you point to some issues and controversies where the two are in contention, so that we can more fully understand what you mean by top-down/bottom-up? Another question that arises, can you name a principle that has emerged from 'top-down' cosmology and one that has emerged from 'bottom up' cosmology? I guess I am also looking for another term that might shed light on the two ways of looking. Is the Anthropic Principle a reflection of top-down or bottom-up cosmology?

I agree. Why I am waiting until Valliant reappears is that he is a useful foil, and because he is the author. That the triad of sewer-dwellers noted has achieved a victory by his silence . . . no, of course not. These are interesting questions. The first -- Valliant has been the only sustained poster in defence of PARC. The threads on PARC need him, because otherwise we simply get young Kasper or manly-girl Olivia or other also-rans who don't pay attention to anything but the cartoon version of events. Secondly, and thirdly, as Brant notes, there is thinning, browned and stressed out turf where once was a busy field. So many have moved on from SOLO, so many haven't the intellectual armaments needed to sustain discussion. In short, Lindsay rarely says anything interesting in the PARC threads, and almost never says anything that isn't a shrill caricature of an angry, bitter extremist. Ooh. Ah. Ouch.

Do you know for a fact that photons (etc.) cannot be reduced to further parts[?]. Your question puzzles me, Michael. In some corners of the high holonic literature I have read that holons can be 'quarks' (or elementary particles).** But in none of the literature I am familiar with is it suggested that light/photons are able to be dissociated into constituent elements. Are you asserting that photons and electrons are dissociable? I don't think so. In my larger remarks you will note that an electron is not a quark, and a photon is not a quark -- thus an earlier formulation that everything is made of quarks is wrong. As is the formulation that everything is a holon. Unless we are to believe that photons are somehow holons, as quarks would be holons, since everything is a holon. Per your formulation, "In other words, everything is a holon and everything is made up of quarks." Which I think is wrong. While I am at it, I might as well mention a few puzzling bits in your earlier remarks about holons. In a reply to my post in the Dawkins thread, you wrote these items: Now, here you follow on my remarks that I understand the utility of a holon as an heuristic, but find that Wilber and Sheldrake (and in some small measure, Koestler) tend to reify a holon into something in and of itself. In other words, they make the holon-as-holon an actor or agent, rather than the thing or complex in question (I said nothing about emergence, let alone 'emergence people,' and I have no idea who you mean . . . nor do I understand how emergence is properly a force/field. Nor indeed do I find that Wilber considers 'emergence' to be a phenomena directed from the 'top.' Perhaps you could amplify this remark). That is why I mentioned evolutionary developmental biology. In researching epigenetic factors, for example, one can see the blastocyst as a holon, but a holon in development. The interesting questions are derived from the basic one: how does a particular cell differentiate into other functional cells and in generation and growth, build an organism? I don't know if you are familiar enough with Evo-devo to understand my reference, however. It is the fabulous dance of cell/blastocyst, DNA and RNA machinery, methylation, imprinting, chromosome inactivation, epithelial-mesenchymal interactions, genetic assimilation and so on. In any case, the holistic approach of Evo-devo attempts to understand cross-species relicts of evolution and their use and reuse across the eons of development. When I wrote that I couldn't get my head around an unnamed invisible force in-and-of-itself (elan vital), it is because such things as fields are fields caused by something, and I want to know what those somethings are. The 'morphogenetic field,' noted by Ellen, is an abstraction of the constraints of development -- it is not the constraints itself. It is a mathematical rendering of the constraints, a map or graph. Do you follow that distinction? If so, you can perhaps understand where I go off the rails with holonics and Wilber's extrusions. The interesting thing for me is the varied constraints that allow or channel the developing organism (part-listed above); in other words I know that there is not a single thing that constrains, but many, and the resulting 'morphological landscape' is not the result of a single, cryptic actor. Well, you are wrong here: the historical pattern of movement is a canard that has been most adequately debunked by Gould. I include here an image that might help you understand how the 'telic impulse' as intuited by many is quite wrong: [i also include notes that accompanied the illustration: PROGRESS DOES NOT RULE (and is not even a primary thrust of ) the evolutionary process. For reasons of chemistry and physics, life arises next to the "left wall" of its simplest conceivable and preservable complexity. This style of life (bacterial) has remained most common and most successful. A few creatures occasionally move to the right, thus extending the right tail in the distribution of complexity. Many always move to the left, but they are absorbed within space already occupied. Note that the bacterial mode has never changed in position, but just grown higher. See, there is no simple force that drives all life to the 'right.' Similarly, the invisible 'something extra' (call it as Sheldrake and Wilber do, the 'morphic field') suggests an independent existence in their theories about life, telos, evolution. Thus, in their view it is not the sum total or aggregate of individual forces (from chemical valences to Hox genes), it is not the myriad physical forces and constraints that guide development -- it is an independent force, a mystical force, a spiritual force. I don't accept that in my science at the moment. Perhaps you misunderstood my point about noses and forces. Here is what I wrote: "From what evidence can we posit this invisible but active field, as if it were true and verifiable and as accessible to the nose as any strong odor would be to a mammal like us?" Not quite the same as "how to access such a force by the nose." But I should rephrase, and perhaps explain again my point of view. In context, I spoke of the utility of Holonics as a form of pattern-seeking, as a guide to inquiry, as a recognition of the relationships and forces and interdependencies that wick and weave through our world. I reject that holons are something apart in another realm from their constituents, existing timelessly, and exerting an independent force as holons. This is what Sheldrake and Wilber put forth, and which I reject. So, to rephrase: if there is an invisible and active field, if it is verifiable and accessible to the senses/mind . . . where is the evidence? Forgive the poor construction of the sentence that leads to seizing on 'nose' and 'field/force.' I meant to put the stress on evidence. Where is the evidence of holonic/morphic fields as an independent actor in development? Where is the 'strong odour' that we can pick up with our instruments and our mind/brains? And from where comes that strong odour? I submit that there is as much evidence of independent morphic fields as there is of pixies in the garden. Hope that helps. If you have doubts about what I mean, please ask. To my mind/nose, the Wilberian/Sheldrakian corpus smells fishy. ** [Wilber takes on quarks as sentient beings, from A Kosmos Composed of Perspectives] In AQAL metatheory, individual holons (quarks, atoms, molecules, cells, organisms) are sentient beings, all the way up, all the way down. Even atoms have prehension. If you are not comfortable pushing sentience all the way down, feel free to pick up the story at whatever evolutionary point you think that experience or proto-experience of some sort emerges in the universe (and you can picture all of the lower forms as "precursors" of experience and awareness). Presumably by the time we get to humans, the native (folk) perspectives of first-, second-, and third-perspectives have emerged, and you can take it from there. But if we do view the Kosmos as being composed primarily of sentient beings--not systems, not processes, not webs, not information, not matter, not energy, but sentient beings--then we must simultaneously build a Kosmos composed of perspectives--not feelings, not awareness, not perceptions, not consciousness, for all of those are always already perspectives. If quarks have prehension, then the first quark is not a first particle but a first person. And whatever that quark registers is not a second particle but a second person. There is no way around this. The universe is built of perspectives.

Thanks for taking the time from the malefic demands of your schedule to post your caution. I have picked up Koestler's "Janus" and have the "Ghost in the Machine" on order at our library. I take your caution to heart with regard to Koestler's mystical leanings. Indeed, 'psi' research was in its infancy an attempt to discover through scientific means the forces and actors of a normally unseen world. Its paucity of findings cannot be credited to Koestler, nor should he be dismissed as a crank/crackpot/mystic. I did find it a little disconcerting that this was one of the foci of Koestler's interests later in his career, but in the same way as I can't dismiss all that Wallace wrote on evolution because he reverted to spritism in his dotage, I won't dismiss all of Koestler! Sadly, what has perhaps done most to damage or dilute Koestler's influence is the noxious post-mortem charges against him, the violence towards women that was highlighted in the Cesarani's Arthur Koestler: the Homeless Mind. See also this acccount here.

This is how I understand the holon, Roger, as an heuristic that does not fit all things at all times, a kind of template of understanding one can apply in some cases and not in others. It just doesn't seem useful to posit that everything is made of quarks (not correct either, electrons and other leptons are not made of quarks) unless one also sketches out the relationships and the rules/patterns that make the system hang together. Similarly everything is a holon, as baldly stated, is meaningless (and incorrect in the example of photons, electrons). One needs to add in the additional information: if a human being is a holon, fine, it is part of what larger thing, then -- society? family? clade? primate? species? vertebrate? I don't think merely assigning humans as holons works without establishing the holarchy or holarchies that contains the humans. And if a biological holon an ATP molecule is part of another (an organelle) which is part of a larger whole (a cell) and then part of a larger whole (multicelluar organism), then how does one make the jump to an even larger whole without defining the relationships? Just to say that humans are holons, parts of 'society' doesn't tell you much that we don't already know by other means. And your later note about humans being members-of-species rather than holons as parts-of-species (in a distinct hierarchical relationship) is well-stated. I believe both you and Ellen have this correct, and this reading is backed by several essays in the Wilberian universe that make the same "member" distinction. In any case, from my reading of Koestler, Wilber and Sheldrake, we should also recognize that there is indeed a 'ghost in the machine' -- with Koestler it was 'psi,' with Wilber it is a mystifying nomenclatural landscape of neologisms, some borrowed, some new, and from Sheldrake we get the morphic resonance or the habits of matter. In each of these cases, it seems to me, the proponents are in search of 'something extra' -- and each is bewildered/angered/apalled by a science that doesn't respect the ghost that they postulate. Koestler's 'new vitalism,' Wilber's evolutionary telos, Sheldrake's morphogenesis . . . this seems part of a struggle to open up science the invisible spirit of the cosmos. That's the part that I don't buy -- the spirit business, and that perhaps is what you reject, Roger in arguments that posit a special something that inside-the-box scientists have not yet acknowledged.

Why "rather chilling," William? I'm wondering if you think that anyone who could ever have seen something promising in Sheldrake's ideas has to have been an idiot, or something to that effect? People aren't omniscient; sometimes what might appear obvious in hindsight wasn't so at the time. The book received a savaging, including in Nature where senior editor John Maddox rated it as "the best candidate for burning there has been for many years." Maddox's censorious thunder continued: "Sheldrake's argument is an exercise in pseudo-science. Many readers will be left with the impression that Sheldrake has succeeded in finding a place for magic within scientific discussion — and this, indeed, may have been a part of the objective of writing such a book." Koestler's blurb is not quite an endorsment, but maybe more a description: perhaps he saw a value in morphic resonance for the scientific community re: evolution theory. The scientific community did not take up the challenge, to date. Koestler an idiot? I don't think so -- he had a grand and long career as public intellectual, but I do note that he tended to mysticism in his later works (even as early as 1972, with The Roots of Coincidence). Since he gave a large bequest to found the Koestler Parapsychology Unit at the University of Edinburgh, I wonder if there was in Sheldrake's work an agreement that 'something is missing' in neo-Darwinian accounts of evolution.

William, Awww. Now that hurts. That means you do not read my posts. No . . . it means I read your posts and your links -- and I even find interesting things in your links that illustrate and extend points made by other list members. I will soldier on at inserting the table of comparisons, for those who don't follow my links and so will have not see the table yet.