Objectivism versus Natural Rights?

[syrakusos]

Xray: It is a principle of Objectivism that morality is personal. Alone on an island, Robinson Crusoe faces the moral choice to think or not to think (to be or not to be). Moreover, in order to survive, he must organize his efforts according to a goal, which goal he must first choose. At first, he chose to make the best of his lot with immediate survival pressing. Then, he chose to build a signal fire (signal smoke) to attract any passing ship. In the actual book his rescue is somewhat accidental. In the movie Castaway, Chuck Noland (Tom Hanks) chooses to leave the island and build a raft. The choosing is morality. He could "choose" randomly, just doing whatever attracted him first moment by moment, but he will not survive long. To survive, he must choose to think, to engage his rational faculty to the fullest possible extent. That is the primary moral act.

One’s right to life is not a starting-point, without antecedent argument for it, in Rand’s mature argument for individual rights. ...

From the circumstance that individual human life is necessarily an end in itself in certain biological respects ... it then has to be argued that in all respects it is possible and right for each individual to make himself an end in himself or herself and that this poses norms respecting that rightness in interpersonal actions, norms we call individual rights.

Stephen, where is Rand's "mature argument"? I have been back and forth through "Man's Rights" and she defines rights as the bridge or link between ethics and politics.

"Rights" are a moral concept - the concept that provides a logical transition from the principles guiding an individual's actions to the principles guiding his relationship with others - the concept that preserves and protects individual morality in a social context, the link between the moral code of a man and the legal code of a society, between ethics and politics.

I had always believed - wrongly, I see now - that your rights exist by your nature as a rational being, thus I considered Objectivism to be a natural rights philosophy. Never in any discussions on these boards with other students of Objectivism do I recall anyone disagreeing with that.

My question was not "What do you think rights are?" The posts here were interesting to scan through, seeing other people (Mr. Benjamin, especially) outline their own opinions, but no one is citing Objectivist text on this. (We cannot write the word "canon" here without creating a link to eBay sales of cameras.)

[Guyau]

Michael,

Rand’s theory of rights is consonant with what you describe under the term natural in #26. Rand held rational nature to be a nature, notwithstanding the circumstance that one can choose how far it will be sovereign for oneself. Peikoff writes of rights being natural in a way you would find congenial, I expect.

The Founding Fathers . . . . started with the premise of the primacy and sovereignty of the individual. . . . Whether or not any social organization exists, each man possesses certain individual rights. . . .

These rights were regarded not as a disparate collection, but as a unity expressing a single fundamental right. Man's rights, declares Samuel Adams, . . . "are evident branches of, rather than deductions from, the duty of self-preservation, commonly called the first law of nature." Man's rights are natural, i.e., their warrant is the laws of reality, not any arbitrary human decision . . . . (Ominous //'s 112)

Rand's conception of and rationale for rights is not entirely coincident with every point in the sketches put forth by Founders. But in quoted sense of natural, Rand and the Founders agreed that rights are natural.

Isn’t natural right normally meant as part of the natural law tradition in ethics? That is the conception with which Brook and I and others contrast Rand's conception. Rand’s theory of ethics, including theory of rights, is not in that prominent school. Her metaphysics of value and moral goodness are radically different than in that view.

Excerpts from Rand’s writings about rights are compiled here. By “Rand’s mature argument for individual rights” I meant* her conception of rights as it is set out and argued in the ethics set out and argued in Atlas Shrugged and beyond.

[anthony]

Tony,

One’s right to life is not a starting-point, without antecedent argument for it, in Rand’s mature argument for individual rights. That life (and only life) is an organization that is an end in itself and that individual human life is necessarily such an organization in some respects can be argued for and become one of the relative starting-points in an argument for individual rights. From the circumstance that individual human life is necessarily an end in itself in certain biological respects, joined with further points about the place of conceptual consciousness in human life and the personal psychological requirements of such a consciousness, it then has to be argued that in all respects it is possible and right for each individual to make himself an end in himself or herself and that this poses norms respecting that rightness in interpersonal actions, norms we call individual rights.

What are called individual rights in American jurisprudence (and perhaps in your country too) are a proper subset of the more sweeping set of individual rights which Rand attempts to support by her argument to the proposition that in all respects it is possible and right for each individual to make himself an end in himself or herself and that this poses norms respecting that rightness in interpersonal actions. The broad scope of her argued proposition supports not only norms on the use of force against persons, as a matter of individual rights, but norms on property entitlements and hence on proper identification of which acts are force given those entitlements, as matters of individual rights.

I concur pretty much with your observations in #3 concerning Rand's theory. However, for that theory, I would say naturalness—as distinct from choices that sometimes do and sometimes do not accord with biological and psychological nature—stops before the proposition that an individual has a right to his own life. It stops with what is in biology and psychology, including causal relations.

Stephen, Ive always been thrown a little by what I saw as Rand's 'double justification' of rights. One,

through rational egoism, the other through "The right to life". Quite rightly, you've shown my

ambivalence. Conveniently, I thought, they both arrive at the same place, they both overlap to a

degree, so I ignored their difference, and so my conflation of them here.

Following the trail back to VoS, I am wondering if there's a clue in 'standard' as distinct from 'purpose',

to their separate justifications - I'd like to put to you.

"The Objectivist ethics holds man's life [qua Man] as the STANDARD of value - and HIS OWN LIFE,

as the ethical PURPOSE of every individual man."

...

""That which is required for the survival of man qua man" is an abstract principle that

applies to every individual man. The task of applying this principle to a concrete, specific

purpose - the purpose of living a life proper to a rational being - belongs to every

individual man, and the life he has to live is his own." [p.25]

My question is then: as "abstract principle" applying to all men, this is metaphysical, yes?

- so can it relate directly to "The right to life", as metaphysically-given, too? i.e. As the STANDARD

for all life, it is a lesser, though direct, branch from metaphysics to politics.(?)

The primary branch - or trunk - then, is O'ist morality, comprised of metaphysics AND epistemology,

and supplying the structure of reason and PURPOSE to individual rights.(?)

Dunno, it makes some sense, but I hope you get the gist of it.

[George H. Smith]

When the Paul Ryan flap hit the press, Amy Peikoff interviewed Yaron Brook about Paul Ryan's having been "influenced" by Ayn Rand. ( "Don't Let It Go Unheard" blog radio with Yaron Brook hear here.) At about 8:50 min:sec in to about 10:45 min:sec out, Yaron Brook implied that Objectivism is not a natural rights philosophy.

This was new to my understanding. I thought that in the essay, "Man's Rights" Ayn Rand said: "Whether one believes that man is the product of a Creator or of nature, the issue of man's origin does not alter the fact that he is an entity of a specific kind - a rational being - that he cannot function successfully under coercion, and that rights are a necessary condition of his particular mode of survival." ("Man's Rights," The Virtue of Selfishness, hb, page 126.)

But, this is not absolute. We may well indeed learn language socially, but alone on an island, Robinson Crusoe still needed language. And, he needed morality. But he did not need rights.

Rights only exist in a social context. Robinson Crusoe could act immorally, but he could not violate his own rights.

Thus, rights are not intrinsic to human nature but only exist within the context of social life.

... or is there something I am missing? (... within the context of Objectivist canon.)

The "natural" in natural rights theory refers to two things: first, rights that derived from human nature; second, rights that are knowable through the natural faculty of reason.

Of course Rand falls in the natural rights tradition. Here as elsewhere, Yaron Brook is clueless.

Ghs

[Xray]

Here is a link to a debate about an article Craig Biddle wrote on Ayn Rand's theory of rights in The Objective Standard:

http://www.theobject...-rights-theory/

[anthony]

Useful - thanks.

"Objective", not natural, intrinsic, inherent, or innate.

[Guyau]

. . .

The "natural" in natural rights theory refers to two things: first, rights that derived from human nature; second, rights that are knowable through the natural faculty of reason.

Of course Rand falls in the natural rights tradition. . . .

Ghs

George, the preeminent contemporary proponent of natural rights has been John Finnis. I wondered if you have read him and if his is a theory of rights anything outside what you describe above. Is the rights theory of Finnis substantially different from the rights theory of Rand? Of Rothbard?

Natural Law and Natural Rights

John Finnis

Related:

The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

PS

I notice a piece by Robert Anton Wilson on natural law in human affairs, which touches on work of George Smith concerning natural law.

An Except

Curiously, while the Natural Law debate was going forth in the New Libertarian in the United States, I was involved in two other debates on Natural Law in Ireland, where I live. Dail Eireann, the Irish parliament, had voted to submit to the people a referendum which would have allowed civil divorce if approved by a majority; you will not be surprised to learn that the proposed legislation was violently opposed by the Roman Catholic hierarchy on the grounds that divorce “is” against “Natural Law”. At the same time, a neo-pagan Dublin magazine, Ancient Ways, was running two debates on whether machinery “was” or “was not” against Natural Law and on whether anti-aging research “is” or “is not” against Natural Law. I participated in both of these debates also, and it became quite clear to me that the Natural Law mystique, in Catholic, libertarian or neo-pagan forms, remains basically a set of rhetorical strategies to hypnotize others into the state which Bernard Shaw called “barbarism” and defined as “the belief that the laws of one’s own tribe are the laws of the universe.”

[Guyau]

. . .

Stephen, Ive always been thrown a little by what I saw as Rand's 'double justification' of rights. One,

through rational egoism, the other through "The right to life". Quite rightly, you've shown my

ambivalence. Conveniently, I thought, they both arrive at the same place, they both overlap to a

degree, so I ignored their difference, and so my conflation of them here.

Following the trail back to VoS, I am wondering if there's a clue in 'standard' as distinct from 'purpose',

to their separate justifications - I'd like to put to you.

"The Objectivist ethics holds man's life [qua Man] as the STANDARD of value - and HIS OWN LIFE,

as the ethical PURPOSE of every individual man."

...

""That which is required for the survival of man qua man" is an abstract principle that

applies to every individual man. The task of applying this principle to a concrete, specific

purpose - the purpose of living a life proper to a rational being - belongs to every

individual man, and the life he has to live is his own." [p.25]

My question is then: as "abstract principle" applying to all men, this is metaphysical, yes?

- so can it relate directly to "The right to life", as metaphysically-given, too? i.e. As the STANDARD

for all life, it is a lesser, though direct, branch from metaphysics to politics.(?)

The primary branch - or trunk - then, is O'ist morality, comprised of metaphysics AND epistemology,

and supplying the structure of reason and PURPOSE to individual rights.(?)

Dunno, it makes some sense, but I hope you get the gist of it.

Tony,

Rand does not take the right to life as metaphysically given. There are principles behind that normative principle that are metaphysically given. Such givens would be that each individual is organically an end in himself and those various conditions for the survival of man as man.

Twenty-five years ago, I added to Rand that there are also game-theoretic facts behind rights. These are facts pertinent to individual rational choice in a social context, including the choice to follow rights-norms: a, b, c0, c1, c2, c3.

I'm pretty sure I'm not following the idea of your last paragraph very well. It is perhaps not a clear path in the woods you were saying. I will say this much. Rand's ethical egoism and her rights theory both proceed from her view (which is partly metaphysical fact [biology and psychology], partly normative [choice to apply to all one's character]) that "Man—every man—is an end in himself." I do not think that Rand’s standard for correct values is secondary to or less direct than what Rand maintains as the purpose of correct values. Her character Hank Rearden observes that whether something is practical depends on what one is trying to practice. In individual development—and this Rand recognized—pleasure and pain of the individual precedes and is a lead to good and evil. But that temporal priority is not significant when one comes to deliberations of what one ought to do. Into that deliberation and into the political constitution, Rand would place justice and respect for individual rights. These are means to the good life of all individuals living together, and the individual’s good life is partly constituted by realizing that and by holding them as values. Rand has her character John Galt say there is something he owes his fellow man: rationality, the same thing he owes himself. Rand argues that justice and individual rights are part of that rationality.

[George H. Smith]

. . .

The "natural" in natural rights theory refers to two things: first, rights that derived from human nature; second, rights that are knowable through the natural faculty of reason.

Of course Rand falls in the natural rights tradition. . . .

Ghs

George, the preeminent contemporary proponent of natural rights has been John Finnis. I wondered if you have read him and if his is a theory of rights anything outside what you describe above. Is the rights theory of Finnis substantially different from the rights theory of Rand? Of Rothbard?

Natural Law and Natural Rights

John Finnis

Related:

The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics

Yes, I've read Finnis; in fact I quote him at least once in my forthcoming book from Cambridge. I haven't read his book in several years, but my recollection is that he differs from Rand in some important respects. as most Aristotelians do. The Randians Doug Rasmussen and Doug Den Uyl attempted to place Rand in the Aristotelian tradition (Liberty and Nature: An Aristotelian Defense of the Liberal Order), but I would describe Rand as more in the Grotian tradition of natural rights.

Here is how I summarized the approach of Grotius in my Liberty article "Thinking About War":

Grotius based his theory of rights on an ethics of rational self-interest. In the words of Richard Tuck (a leading authority in this field), Grotius “went back to the principles of the Stoics…in particular the Stoic claim that the primary force governing human affairs is the desire for self-preservation. But he interpreted this desire in moral terms, as the one and only universal right: no one could ever be blamed for protecting themselves….”

Man has an “impelling desire for society,” but the benefits of social interaction are conditional. Other people can harm us as well as help us, so certain conditions must be maintained if we are to reap the advantages of social interaction. Fortunately, man possesses the unique ability to reason, which Grotius describes as “the faculty of knowing and acting in accord with general principles.”Reason thus enables man to formulate and act upon the general principles that set the foundation for a beneficial social order.

Foremost among these conditions is the preservation of one’s suum, i.e., moral jurisdiction and power over one’s life, body, and liberty. For Grotius, these spheres of moral jurisdiction are expressed is terms of rights, which define and delimit the use of physical force in society. Grotius would have wholeheartedly agreed with Ayn Rand’s statement that “Individual rights are the means of subordinating society to moral law."

According to Grotius, people form political societies primarily for the purpose of protecting their rights from the violent invasions of others: “the end of society is to form a common and united aid to preserve to every one his own.” Self-preservation is a fundamental right that is violated by the initiation of physical force, so self-defense is a right “which nature grants to every one.” Rights “do not prohibit all use of force, but only that use of force…which attempts to take away the rights of another.” The right of self-defense justifies the retaliatory use of force: “a person, if he has no other means of saving his life, is justified in using any forcible means of repelling an attack.” This reasoning also applies to our conduct in a just war, which has as its purpose “the preservation of our lives and persons.”

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

Here is a link to a debate about an article Craig Biddle wrote on Ayn Rand's theory of rights in The Objective Standard:

http://www.theobject...-rights-theory/

Here is the core of Biddle's argument that Rand is not a "natural rights" theorist:

Rights don’t exist in man, like bones or lungs. Rights are not physical existents or physical processes but mental integrations of observed facts. This is why they are properly regarded not as “natural,” but as objective.

This is yet another example of the Columbus Complex that is so popular among orthodox O'ists. Rand is made to seem completely original (I don't deny her originality on some points) by misrepresenting philosophers who preceded her. Biddle exploits the fact that Rand gave distinctive meanings to terms like "inherent" and "objective" that earlier philosophers did not accept; so rather than give those earlier philosophers a fair hearing, by attempting to understand what they meant, regardless of the words they used, he proclaims that Rand was not a natural-rights philosopher.

What important natural-rights philosopher, I would like to know, ever treated rights as akin to bones, lungs, and other physical attributes of man? This is flagrant nonsense. Those who follow Orthodox Objectivists in this and in other matters of intellectual history deserve what they get.

Ghs

[syrakusos]

Michael,

Rand’s theory of rights is consonant with what you describe under the term natural in #26. Rand held rational nature to be a nature, notwithstanding the circumstance that one can choose how far it will be sovereign for oneself. Peikoff writes of rights being natural in a way you would find congenial, I expect. ...

Isn’t natural right normally meant as part of the natural law tradition in ethics? That is the conception with which Brook and I ...

Stephen, thanks for the links.

1.2 Natural law and practical rationality

When we focus on the recipient of the natural law, that is, us human beings, the thesis of Aquinas's natural law theory that comes to the fore is that the natural law constitutes the basic principles of practical rationality for human beings, and has this status by nature (ST IaIIae 94, 2). The notion that the natural law constitutes the basic principles of practical rationality implies, for Aquinas, both that the precepts of the natural law are universally binding by nature (ST IaIIae 94, 4) and that the precepts of the natural law are universally knowable by nature (ST IaIIae 94, 4; 94, 6).

That out-take is just one point, of course, and the discussion here throughout offers much to think about regarding Objectivism's actual claims (from Ayn Rand's works) and the broader beliefs of others who are in emotional or sense-of-life agreement with them.

George: Thanks for the citation to Grotius. I knew of him from a class in Constitutional Law, but never read anything directly. I will do so. (That Yaron Brook is clueless about so much is probably why he cannot appreciate your genius. And it's too bad, because you really are smart about a lot of things, just not persons qua persons.)

[Guyau]

Thanks, George (#34). Looking forward to your new book.

Thought of Hugo Grotius figures into Ellen Frankel Paul’s arguments in Property Rights and Eminent Domain (Transaction 1987). It figures prominently in the section “Property Theories and Property Defenses” (193–201).

An Excerpt

In Locke’s writings, private property is a natural right, but for his predecessor, Grotius, property in its first invention is a creation of human will. Once established, however, it becomes a breach of the law of nature for one man to seize the property of another. In this significant respect, Locke departs from the other natural law theorists. He holds a modern view of natural rights, where rights mean entitlements to things that men hold by virtue of their nature, combined with their acts. Grotius still held to a classical notion of natural rights as meaning simply something that is right or good by its conformity to reason, a use of the term embraced by Aristotle. Thus for Grotius, what is naturally right consists of two categories of propositions: principally, those things that are right independently of man’s will, and derivatively, those things that become right because of the way man exercises his will. The case of property falls into the latter classification. Property is initially a creation of human will, but once established, it carries with it the force of natural right. Then it becomes wrong by the law of nature for one man to seize what another has once acquired. The formulation is reminiscent of that advanced by St. Thomas Aquinas.

Grotius’s justification of property is problematic on several counts. . . . (1987)

One big problem I have with some natural-rights and natural-law theories is that they suppose an ontological priority of goodness over being, such as with Plato and most theologians. Technically, that priority holds with Aristotle and Kant too, although there is much in their writings that belies that priority. Rand should object that goodness, consciousness, reason, and choice are subsidiary of specifically living being, and the way in which she should stack goodness and rights within living being would be pretty different than the way other moderns such as Locke or Hobbes would stack it because of what is her specific theory of value.

[George H. Smith]

Thanks, George (#34). Looking forward to your new book.

Thought of Hugo Grotius figures into Ellen Frankel Paul’s arguments in Property Rights and Eminent Domain (Transaction 1987). It figures prominently in the section “Property Theories and Property Defenses” (193–201).

An Excerpt

In Locke’s writings, private property is a natural right, but for his predecessor, Grotius, property in its first invention is a creation of human will. Once established, however, it becomes a breach of the law of nature for one man to seize the property of another. In this significant respect, Locke departs from the other natural law theorists. He holds a modern view of natural rights, where rights mean entitlements to things that men hold by virtue of their nature, combined with their acts. Grotius still held to a classical notion of natural rights as meaning simply something that is right or good by its conformity to reason, a use of the term embraced by Aristotle. Thus for Grotius, what is naturally right consists of two categories of propositions: principally, those things that are right independently of man’s will, and derivatively, those things that become right because of the way man exercises his will. The case of property falls into the latter classification. Property is initially a creation of human will, but once established, it carries with it the force of natural right. Then it becomes wrong by the law of nature for one man to seize what another has once acquired. The formulation is reminiscent of that advanced by St. Thomas Aquinas.

Grotius’s justification of property is problematic on several counts. . . . (1987)

I don't agree with some aspects of Paul's account of Grotius, but I don't know how much detail I should go into, given that Grotius is little more than a name to most OL members. I will say, however, that rights, for Grotius, are enforceable moral claims against other men to one's suum, i.e., that which is properly one's own (including one's body, labor, and the fruits thereof), according to the precepts of natural law.

Contrary to Paul's suggestion, Locke's approach to rights is very similar to that of Grotius. There is a reason, after all, why Locke recommended the books of Grotius and Pufendorf as the best works on political philosophy ever written.

Neither Aristotle nor Aquinas had a clearly developed notion of "subjective" rights, i.e., rights (enforceable moral claims) that belong to the individual subject and give him legitimate moral options. (To have a right to do x does not mean that one must do x.) This notion does not appear until some later Scholastics, such as Suarez, developed it in considerable detail. And it was mainly via Grotius that this modern notion of individual rights became part and parcel of classical liberal thinking.

A great deal has been written in recent decades on the history of natural rights theory. Two books I especially recommend are Stephen Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property: Grotius to Hume (the excellent chapter on Grotius will indicate why I dissent from Paul's treatment in ways that I have not discussed here); and Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies in Natural Rights, Natural Law, and Church Law 1150-1625).

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

Two writers who exercised a tremendous influence on America's Founders were Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui (The Principles of Natural and Politic Law) and Emer de Vattel (The Law of Nations). Of special interest to O'ist types was Vattel's attempt to ground moral obligation (including the moral obligation to respect the rights of others) solely on rational self-interest, without any appeal to an external authority.

Vattel in particular was regarded as a standard source by 18th century Americans. One will find him quoted and cited many times in the literature of the time.

Both these books have been published by Liberty Fund, as part of their series "Natural Law and Enlightenment Classics." These are first-rate scholarly editions, and they are inexpensive to boot. They can also be read online for free at the Online Library of Liberty (a branch of Liberty Fund) at:

http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=1717&Itemid=99999999

and

http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=2246&chapter=212408&layout=html&Itemid=27

Ghs

[MrBenjamatic]

"It cannot be moral to give something away."

Rationalism will leave you in the ditch with statements like this.

--Brant

You're right, I should have worded that: helping others cannot be moral. I should have been more specific. That sentence I thought about only for a second before posting it and now I realize was wrong.

[MrBenjamatic]

I hold that the right to that which is yours and no one elses and is yours naturally (see my explanation above) is something you are born with as it is an ability. Rights are the ability to use and dispose of, offer to trade and give away that which is yours and no one else's with no one else's permission. Ability is the best word I could think of for the context of my explanation and justification of rights.

Furthermore, it is right to be moral and in order to be moral you have to exersize your ability to use and dispose of, offer to trade that which is yours and no one else's with no one else's permission. Though rights include the ability to give away that which is yours and no one else's without permission, it cannot be moral to give something away.

MrBen,

Have you got ahold of VoS and CUI yet? As Xray advised you somewhere,

you have to check those premises (also, definitions). Otherwise all your logic -

and some of it seems tautologous, and begs the question - is going to fall down.

Great to go about it your own way, but having also spent years re-inventing the wheel,

I learned finally that stubborn pride can be the flipside of an independent mindset.

The sooner you grasp Rand's ideas at source, the less ingrained the errors you

will have to prise out later.

THEN, that independent mind will come into its own.

Which premises of mine are contradictory? Where have I made mistakes regarding definitions?

[MrBenjamatic]

Some rights are natural, the others are rights by social contract (charity, trading).

Needs can be natural, but what what rights are "natural"? isn't the notion of "right" a construction of the human mind?

I think you naturally have a right to that which is yours and no one else's naturally. Your ability to use your brain is a right that is yours naturally.

I have made these posts so others can check my premises. The premise I wanted checked in particular is my explaining rights as an ability (the ability to use and dispose of, offer to trade and give away that which is yours and no one else's without permission). I wonder if there's a better word than ability to use. I am certain that rights protect your ability to "use and dispose of, offer to trade and give away that which is yours and no one else's with no one else's permission", I merely wonder whether rights themselves ARE that specific ability: the ability to "use and dispose of, offer to trade and give away that which is yours and no one else's with no one else's permission".

[Xray]

You're right, I should have worded that: helping others cannot be moral.

You consider helping others as immoral then?

[Guyau]

Let's bring this forward to the new page.

Thanks, George (#34). Looking forward to your new book.

Thought of Hugo Grotius figures into Ellen Frankel Paul’s arguments in Property Rights and Eminent Domain (Transaction 1987). It figures prominently in the section “Property Theories and Property Defenses” (193–201).

An Excerpt

In Locke’s writings, private property is a natural right, but for his predecessor, Grotius, property in its first invention is a creation of human will. Once established, however, it becomes a breach of the law of nature for one man to seize the property of another. In this significant respect, Locke departs from the other natural law theorists. He holds a modern view of natural rights, where rights mean entitlements to things that men hold by virtue of their nature, combined with their acts. Grotius still held to a classical notion of natural rights as meaning simply something that is right or good by its conformity to reason, a use of the term embraced by Aristotle. Thus for Grotius, what is naturally right consists of two categories of propositions: principally, those things that are right independently of man’s will, and derivatively, those things that become right because of the way man exercises his will. The case of property falls into the latter classification. Property is initially a creation of human will, but once established, it carries with it the force of natural right. Then it becomes wrong by the law of nature for one man to seize what another has once acquired. The formulation is reminiscent of that advanced by St. Thomas Aquinas.

Grotius’s justification of property is problematic on several counts. . . . (1987)

I don't agree with some aspects of Paul's account of Grotius, but I don't know how much detail I should go into, given that Grotius is little more than a name to most OL members. I will say, however, that rights, for Grotius, are enforceable moral claims against other men to one's suum, i.e., that which is properly one's own (including one's body, labor, and the fruits thereof), according to the precepts of natural law.

Contrary to Paul's suggestion, Locke's approach to rights is very similar to that of Grotius. There is a reason, after all, why Locke recommended the books of Grotius and Pufendorf as the best works on political philosophy ever written.

Neither Aristotle nor Aquinas had a clearly developed notion of "subjective" rights, i.e., rights (enforceable moral claims) that belong to the individual subject and give him legitimate moral options. (To have a right to do x does not mean that one must do x.) This notion does not appear until some later Scholastics, such as Suarez, developed it in considerable detail. And it was mainly via Grotius that this modern notion of individual rights became part and parcel of classical liberal thinking.

A great deal has been written in recent decades on the history of natural rights theory. Two books I especially recommend are Stephen Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property: Grotius to Hume (the excellent chapter on Grotius will indicate why I dissent from Paul's treatment in ways that I have not discussed here); and Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies in Natural Rights, Natural Law, and Church Law 1150-1625).

Ghs

Thanks for the information, George, and thanks for the references and links in #39.

[George H. Smith]

Thanks for the information, George, and thanks for the references and links in #39.

I should add that Vattel's case for self-interest as the foundation for moral obligation is mainly found not in his treatise in a separate essay, Essay on the Foundation of Natural Law and on the First Principle of the Obligation Men Find Themselves Under to Observe Laws. This is included in the Liberty Fund edition can can be read online at:

http://bit.ly/RDlb7j

Ghs

[anthony]

You're right, I should have worded that: helping others cannot be moral. I should have been more specific. That sentence I thought about only for a second before posting it and now I realize was wrong.

Still false: On the contrary, it is often totally rational and moral to willingly help others (i.e.strangers).

Where do you get this stuff? If you don't understand rational selfishness, don't fake it. Ask. Read. There must be dozens of pertinent threads on OL.

In terms of Objectivist ethics, the worst harm is to misrepresent something to yourself, only secondarily to others. And some people are not as honest and as forthright as you, and knowing your ignorance, will cynically use your statements against you (or against Objectivist ethics in general.)

[caroljane]

Some rights are natural, the others are rights by social contract (charity, trading).

Needs can be natural, but what what rights are "natural"? isn't the notion of "right" a construction of the human mind?

I think you naturally have a right to that which is yours and no one else's naturally. Your ability to use your brain is a right that is yours naturally.

I have made these posts so others can check my premises. The premise I wanted checked in particular is my explaining rights as an ability (the ability to use and dispose of, offer to trade and give away that which is yours and no one else's without permission). I wonder if there's a better word than ability to use. I am certain that rights protect your ability to "use and dispose of, offer to trade and give away that which is yours and no one else's with no one else's permission", I merely wonder whether rights themselves ARE that specific ability: the ability to "use and dispose of, offer to trade and give away that which is yours and no one else's with no one else's permission".

Ability is either an inherent fitness for a certain task, or the enabling of that task by others.

I have the ability to learn the role of Queen of the Night for example, and to sing it.

But I don't have the ability to get anybody to listen to me beyond the first few notes.

[syrakusos]

Thanks again to George and Stephen. I need to block out some serious time - like three months - just to pursue these. Pufendorf and Vattel are among forty or so in "The Founders' Libraries." Conservative scholars Forrest MacDonald and Donald S. Lutz compiled inventories of the books and authors cited by the Founders and by others in their generation. This helps on several levels. It is interesting in its own right, of course, but also provides a context for constitutional originalism. (Vattel, for instance held that both parents must be citizens for their child to be a "natural born citizen.") Relevant here, these all help to understand the Objectivist theory of (natural) rights, as existing within that tradition. I still remain ignorant about why Yaron Brook would say that Objectivism is not a natural rights philosophy. (As for everyone else, it is nice that you have your own theories.)

Online Library of Liberty

Founding Father's Library: A Bibliographical Essay by Forrest McDonald

Forrest McDonald is Professor of History at the University of Alabama and has written a number of introductions to Liberty Fund books.

Source: This essay first appeared in the journal Literature of Liberty: A Review of Contemporary Liberal Thought , vol. 1, no. 1 January/March 1978 published by the Cato Institute (1978-1979) and the Institute for Humane Studies (1980-1982) under the editorial direction of Leonard P. Liggio. It is republished with thanks to the original copyright holders.

The Most Commonly Read Books of the Founding Generation by Donald S. Lutz

The Founding Fathers of the American Constitution made it clear what authors and texts had influenced their own thinking on the idea of liberty. Donald S. Lutz has examined the speeches, letters, journalism, and theoretical works of the founding generation in order to draw up a composite "library catalog" of that generation. His list includes most of the texts on the Goodrich Seminar Room list and a few more besides. Lutz's "top 40" texts (actually 37) by frequency of citation by the founding generation are listed below.

St. Paul

Montesquieu

Sir William Blackstone

John Locke

David Hume

Plutarch

Cesare Beccaria

...

[9thdoctor]

I have the ability to learn the role of Queen of the Night for example, and to sing it.

But I don't have the ability to get anybody to listen to me beyond the first few notes.

Not even the cat?

[caroljane]

I have the ability to learn the role of Queen of the Night for example, and to sing it.

But I don't have the ability to get anybody to listen to me beyond the first few notes.

Not even the cat?

Especially not the cat. I've got the scratch marks to prove it.