David Hume's argument contra validity of induction

[Ellen Stuttle]

The point is that Randians are always busy bashing Popper, but they can hardly blame him for using another definition (that was also used by Hume) than the Randian definition. If Objectivists claim to have solved the problem of induction, they should use the definition that was used in stating the problem, i.e. Hume's and Popper's definition, not their own, new definition, because then they haven't solved anything, they've merely sidestepped the problem.

DF, that states the issue with admirable brevity. ;-)

I'll add some additional points:

The current O'ist doctrine of "Contextual Certainty" concedes (without saying so in so many words) that the traditional "problem of induction" can't be solved.

Further, insulting remarks are made about those who even tried to solve the traditional problem, and who thought it maybe could be solved; these people are said to have had a wrong theory of knowledge and to have been requiring omniscience. The assessment I think has some merit, but without the pejorative, denegrating tone that goes along with the assessment.

However, a bit of a joke on the O'ists is involved, since Ayn Rand herself, as late as the time of the Epistemology workshops, had the expectation that the traditional problem could be solved. This is clear from her remarks in the discussion with Larry ("Prof. M") in the workshop transcript. There was more to that discussion; not all of it is recorded in the published version, but what's there is enough to show that she was expecting a solution could be found.

I remember from the '70s that the attempt to find a solution to the traditional problem was a big topic amongst my academic circle of O'ist friends: Larry and me, David Kelley (who joined us when he was in New York), the Knapp brothers, Shosh Milgram, Debbie Goldstein, Evan Picoult, Lee Pierson, a brilliant mathematician named Robert Rubenstein (I don't know what ever became of him; I haven't heard of him in years), and others who were less regular attendees at our gatherings. Meanwhile, the issue, so we heard, also received attention in the purist intellectual group: Harry Binswanger, Allan Gotthelf, Lew Little, their friends.

So the idea that it was stupidly wrong-headed, and implying an omniscience standard of knowledge, even to try to solve the traditional problem hasn't always been part of the O'ist doctrine of "Contextual Certainty."

A further point is that, in their redefinition of what the "problem" even is/was, O'ists have gotten themselves mixed up as to what Popper, and Hume, et al., meant by "induction". They've taken to talking as if Popper, Hume, et al., meant by "induction" what they, the O'ists, now use the term to mean. So they bash Popper, Hume, et al., for not seeing their, the O'ist's, "solution" to their, the O'ists, redefined problem.

It amounts to a double whammy of unfairness -- simultaneously conceding that Popper, Hume, et. al., were right about the unsolvability of the traditional problem while accusing those people of denegrating "induction" defined as the O'ists have redefined it to mean something different than was traditionally meant.

Ellen

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Edited September 3, 2008 by Ellen Stuttle

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

There seems to be a misunderstanding.

I don't give two hoots about solving the traditional problem of induction because I don't believe in the problem. It has the same value to me as some crossword puzzle thing. Worse. It has turned into a vanity issue and not one of ideas. (I'm right and you're wrong crap.)

I agree that if you change the definition, you are not playing by the rules that were originally laid out. Rand did that and no one is denying it. I don't know why it is insinuated all the time that Objectivists don't see that. This one does.

I do believe the original problem was stated with a loaded deck, though, because it makes no allowance for the formation of concepts. This is where I believe Rand's disdain came from and I agree with her.

So did she solve the problem using Hume's definitions? No.

Did she show where there were parts missing in a proposition where a part of thinking is presented as a whole, leading to a whole slew of intellectual attacks against the mind? Yes.

This last is from me. Did she complete the task? No.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

It amounts to a double whammy of unfairness -- simultaneously conceding that Popper, Hume, et. al., were right about the unsolvability of the traditional problem while accusing those people of denegrating "induction" defined as the O'ists have redefined it to mean something different than was traditionally meant.

Ellen,

I don't know where you get your sense of fairness, but when a dude says induction doesn't even exist and those who hold it does are mistaken, that's denigrating induction by any standard.

How can you look at that, then look at the evaluation and call it unfair? Do you deny Popper said that or do you pretend he meant something else?

There comes a time when a person needs to be taken at his word. Hitler said he was out to get the Jews and nobody believed him. Popper says induction does not exist. (Nyquist holds to that, too.) How clear does he have to be before you take him seriously?

Popper merely took Hume's statement to the only place it could go and be consistent: that Hume'a argument essentially proved that induction was not only not deduction, but it did not exist at all. The problem is this position doesn't correspond to the whole picture of human thought. It is an attempt at an amputation.

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

It amounts to a double whammy of unfairness -- simultaneously conceding that Popper, Hume, et. al., were right about the unsolvability of the traditional problem while accusing those people of denegrating "induction" defined as the O'ists have redefined it to mean something different than was traditionally meant.

Ellen,

I don't know where you get your sense of fairness, but when a dude says induction doesn't even exist and those who hold it does are mistaken, that's denigrating induction by any standard.

Michael,

I don't understand why you coninue not to grasp that you are NOT talking about the same process Popper was talking about when using the term "induction." Your meaning is different from his. He wasn't denigrating what you mean; he wasn't talking about what you mean.

I'll give you an analogy which I hope will help. Suppose that you use the term "unicorn" to refer to what a lot of other people call a "horse." What those people mean by "unicorn" is the traditional meaning. If those people say that "unicorns," defined as they define the meaning of "unicorn," don't exist, they are not claiming that what you call a "unicorn" (but they would call a "horse") does not exist.

Furthermore, to answer your next question:

How can you look at that, then look at the evaluation and call it unfair? Do you deny Popper said that or do you pretend he meant something else?

It isn't accurate to describe Popper as having said that "induction" -- as he defined it, not as you define it -- doesn't even exist, in the sense of saying that no one ever uses or has used such a procedure (as assuming on the basis of a set of examples that a universalized generalization can be made about that example type). He said that it doesn't exist as a logically defensible method.

We did go over that point at length on another thread. You had Googled "induction does not exist" and you found a number of hits. But I don't think you bothered to read the items in which you found that wording. I did read a number of them. The context of the full pieces makes clear that what was being said was that Popper denied that "induction" -- traditionally defined, I repeat -- exists as a logically defensible method; he also denied that "induction" (as he defined it, not as you define it) in fact is, contra Hume, used in people's learning processes.

Popper and Hume agreed that "induction" (as they defined it) is logically indefensible (Hume's logical problem of induction). But Hume thought that people have to use it in extending their knowledge and thus are doomed to using an illogical procedure (Hume's psychological problem of induction). Popper argued that people don't in fact use this procedure but instead something which looks deceptively like it, and thus that people aren't doomed to being illogical in extending their knowledge.

To repeat once more, he was NOT talking about what you mean by "induction." That's just the unfairness I'm pointing out. You keep insisting that he meant what you mean and therefore accusing him of denigrating what you mean. You won't understand what he was saying unless you get clear that he was defining the term "induction" differently than you are and that you aren't addressing the process he was talking about.

Ellen

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Edited September 3, 2008 by Ellen Stuttle

[Ellen Stuttle]

I do believe the original problem was stated with a loaded deck, though, because it makes no allowance for the formation of concepts. This is where I believe Rand's disdain came from and I agree with her.

The original problem doesn't pertain to the formation of concepts. Repeating, it pertains to reasoning from a limited set of examples to a universalized conclusion about that example type.

I'll give you a for instance which might help. Suppose someone were to conclude, since there hasn't yet been found any non-confirming evidence that "e=mc^2" holds universally, that the issue is settled forever, that we know that no non-confirming evidence ever could turn up. This would be an example of the process Popper and Hume were talking about.

They weren't addressing concept formation.

The effort to solve the traditional logical problem was the effort to find a way to know when you've observed enough confirming instances to conclude with certainty that a universal extrapolating from those instances will hold.

This is exactly what Rand understood the traditional logical problem to be. As late as '70 she thought of this traditional problem as being solvable. (Whether she changed her mind about that in her later years, I don't know.)

Possibly something which confuses you here is that Peikoff today is claiming that the O'ist theory of concepts holds the means of getting principles of causality from direct experience. This is a different Humean problem, that of how we'd ever arrive at necessary causal connections.

Ellen

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Edited September 3, 2008 by Ellen Stuttle

[Ellen Stuttle]

The Objectivist claim that induction is a valid method of getting true general statements from a finite set of particular statements is flat out false.

The Objectivist doctrine of "contextual certainty" doesn't precisely claim that. Instead, it says that your conclusions formed contextually correctly today might turn out to be wrong (thus conceding the point that the traditional problem isn't solvable).

Here's a succinct statement from the paper by Ed Locke I quoted -- here -- on the "Blame David Hume" thread:

"The Case for Inductive Theory Building"

Journal of Management, Vol. 33 No. 6, December 2007 867-890

DOI: 10.1177/0149206307307636

© 2007 Southern Management Association. All rights reserved.

pg. 872

[O]ne's conclusions can be correct based on all the knowledge available at the time but may later have to be modified in an expanded context of knowledge [...].

As Fred Seddon expressed it elsewhere -- I'm not sure where and I'm not sure if these were his exact words, so I won't use quote marks: [According to the "contextual certainty" idea], one can know X and yet X turns out to be wrong.

Ellen

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[Ellen Stuttle]

Michael, sometimes I despair of ever communicating with you on philosophic issues. Are you completely missing that Popper is defining "induction" differently than you are? And that this point is what I'm trying -- apparently with no success -- to get through to you? He wasn't disparaging what you call "induction," since he didn't mean by "induction" what you mean by "induction." He would have had no objections I'm aware of to the statement that "Some swans are white," a statement well attested by observation. But such a statement isn't what he meant by "induction."

By "induction" he meant an argument, proceeding from premises to a conclusion. E.g., proceeding from the premise that "some swans are white" to the conclusion that "all swans are white," or, more cautiously, "most swans are white." He didn't mean, as you do, an identification of a set of observations.

Ellen,

[....]

You have constantly claimed that the Objectivist definition is not valid so it practically doesn't exist.

I've been reading the posts, as I often do, in reverse order. I just got to this one and I'm dumbfounded.

HUH????

Actually, I despair. Michael, I do not know what you read when you read my posts, but I don't think that whatever it is is what I write.

I have claimed it is and that dictionaries exist so two meanings of the same word can exist, that many people use that definition, etc., etc., etc. Would you like me to cite posts? I have only said this several times in the last 2 days alone.

Where have I said that different definitions of words can't exist? Where have I said that people (I don't know about "many," but "some") don't use your definition? I even quoted from an article by Edwin A. Locke, who does use your definition (but shows unawareness in the same article that that isn't what Popper meant).

I have also stated that in conceptual terms, Popper and Rand were on the same wavelength on several things, but they used different jargon. I have only said this several times also ever since I read "Two kinds of Definitions" and reported on it. (You vehemently disagreed with me at the time. Now you are agreeing.) Want more posts?

No, I didn't disagree about the particular point you were discussing in the recent context. What I disagreed with you about (and continue to disagree with you about unless you've meanwhile changed your mind) was a different point.

Talking with you about this has been difficult because you want to restrict the word induction to mean the propositional version only and bash everything else as ignorance, especially "Rand's errors." I don't mind bashing them when they are actual errors, but not when the issue is semantics and she was consistent with her meanings.

I've said nothing indicating any desire to "restrict the word induction to mean the propositional version only." What I've been talking about is Objectivists bashing Popper because they're importing their meaning into his usage and not understanding what Popper was talking about.

Nor have I said anything "bash[ing] everything else as ignorance, especially 'Rand's errors.'" I said that the two paragraphs on pg. 28 of ITOE are "muddled and muddling." I continue to think so. She isn't clear what meanings she's using, but, by not specifying, she leaves the impression she's talking about the traditional meanings; however, O'ist concept formation is NOT an example of those meanings. Furthermore, one can't tell from other sources what she might have meant by "induction" and "deduction" in the ITOE passage, since the only other sources cited for her use of either term are her comments on "induction" from the Epistemology Workshop. In those she clearly means the traditional meaning, not the meaning you're using and assuming she meant on pg. 28.

What I have been trying to say all along is (pointing) this is Rand's meaning here and that is Popper's meaning there (or whoever), and both use the word induction. The differences are these and the similarities are those.

Well, Michael, if that's what you've been trying to say, I think you've done a poor job of it, since you continue to talk about Popper denigrating "induction" while never making clear (if you understand this point) that since he didn't mean what you mean, he therefore wasn't denigrating what you mean. You did the same thing again in a post of yours I answered earlier this morning. So I do not see grounds for believing that you have any clear idea (a) what the traditional meaning is; and (b ) what the difference is between the traditional meaning and the O'ist meaning. I would be delighted if you would henceforth proceed to demonstrate a clear understanding of the difference and thus quit making claims that Popper was denigrating something he wasn't discussing.

Ellen

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Edited September 3, 2008 by Ellen Stuttle

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

So you agree that the Objectivist meaning of induction is valid?

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

"The Case for Inductive Theory Building"

[O]ne's conclusions can be correct based on all the knowledge available at the time but may later have to be modified in an expanded context of knowledge [...].

As Fred Seddon expressed it elsewhere -- I'm not sure where and I'm not sure if these were his exact words, so I won't use quote marks: [According to the "contextual certainty" idea], one can know X and yet X turns out to be wrong.

Hi Ellen

FYI, Fred Seddon describes the upshot of Rand's theory as "you can know P, but P may be false." - in other words, a standard-issue skepticism. I extracted this vital point, one of the few interesting ones in Seddon's otherwise thoroughly mistaken essay, in my critique here. And now here is Edwin Locke, saying the same thing as Seddon.

[Ellen Stuttle]

And now here is Edwin Locke, saying the same thing as Seddon.

Thanks for the correct wording of, and a cite of, Seddon's phrasing, Daniel

Yes, indeed, and now here is Edwin Locke, saying the same thing. You may believe that I was quite struck by the "admission," as it were, coming from someone of Locke's standing with the ARI people.

Furthermore, I don't think the details of his wording could be dismissed as a stray "misstate" on Ed Locke's part, considering his acknowledgments footnote:

"The Case for Inductive Theory Building"

Journal of Management, Vol. 33 No. 6, December 2007 867-890

DOI: 10.1177/0149206307307636

© 2007 Southern Management Association. All rights reserved.

pg. 867

The author would like to thank Albert Bandura, Aaron Beck, Dave Harriman, Gary Latham, Keith Lockitch, John McCaskey, and Stephen Speicher for their many helpful contributions to this article. None of them are [sic] responsible for any errors that I might have made. Some of the ideas on induction discussed here were noted in Locke and Latham (2005), but I have made substantial revisions in this article.

Albert Bandura and Aaron Beck are well-known psychological theorists whose respective theories are discussed in the article. Gary Latham has long been an associate/co-researcher of Locke's.

I trust that the other names in the list of those acknowledged need no identifying. ;-)

The Locke and Latham 2005 paper referred to is a chapter in a book:

Locke, E. A., & Latham, G. P. 2005. Goal setting theory: Theory building by induction. In K. G. Smith & M. A. Hitt (Eds.), Great minds in management: The process of theory development: 128-150. New York: Oxford University Press.

Naturally, I'd like to read the earlier presentation to see what was said before the 2007 article's "substantial revisions," but I'll have to wait till later to satisfy my curiosity on that one; too much else to do now.

Ellen

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[Ellen Stuttle]

Ellen,

So you agree that the Objectivist meaning of induction is valid?

Michael

What I think, Michael, is that either you don't understand the double entendre on different meanings of "valid" which makes that question a trick question or you're deliberately trying to pose a trick question (or maybe a combination of both).

What I feel, after the misstated hash you made of my thoughts in your post #157, is too discouraged to have any wish to discuss the subject of induction any further with you.

Ellen

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[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

It is not a trick question and there is no double entendre anywhere at all but in your post.

Either the meaning is valid or it is not. This is not rocket science. If you want to qualify the validity, it is perfectly reasonable to do so.

So far you have insinuated conflicting things about this all over the place and have not been clear.

An admission that it is valid, of course, would mean you would have to clarify "I am using this meaning instead of that" during a discussion and stop all the bashing by insinuating others are ignorant for not using the meaning you prefer.

From your reaction, I gather such objectivity is probably not interesting to you.

I personally find it weird for you to discuss Popper's meaning of induction when he flat out stated that induction had no meaning at all (did not exist), and refuse to state that the Objectivist meaning, which is very clear and used consistently by many, is a valid meaning.

For me, that jig is up. I see it for what it is. You don't have to discuss it any more.

Michael

[Dragonfly]

Either the meaning is valid or it is not. This is not rocket science. If you want to qualify the validity, it is perfectly reasonable to do so.

It was a completely irrelevant question. The point is not whether the Objectivist meaning is "valid", whatever that means (you can assign any meaning to a word if you want), but whether the Objectivist argument against Popper is valid when the Objectivist uses a different meaning than Popper and Hume. That is the criticism that you systematically ignore.

So far you have insinuated conflicting things about this all over the place and have not been clear.

On the contrary, Ellen's posts were quite clear in contrast to yours.

An admission that it is valid, of course, would mean you would have to clarify "I am using this meaning instead of that" during a discussion and stop all the bashing by insinuating others are ignorant for not using the meaning you prefer.

This is a complete fabrication on your part, where did Ellen ever write anything like that? It is quite the other way around: it is the Objectivists who are bashing Popper while using a different definition than he used, which is of course unacceptable.

From your reaction, I gather such objectivity is probably not interesting to you.

A completely unwarranted and nasty personal remark. You can do better than that.

I personally find it weird for you to discuss Popper's meaning of induction when he flat out stated that induction had no meaning at all (did not exist)

When Popper says that induction does not exist, this does not imply that it has no meaning. The meaning that Popper and Hume use is quite clear. Popper only states that this is not the way we acquire knowledge, that is the sense of "does not exist".

, and refuse to state that the Objectivist meaning, which is very clear and used consistently by many, is a valid meaning.

That is completely beside the point. You are continuously trying to suggest that Ellen says that the Objectivist meaning is not valid, but that is completely false. The argument is that Objectivists criticize Popper for the wrong reasons, namely by substituting their own definition for that of Popper. It is completely irrelevant whether any one definition is "better" than the other one, the point is that if you criticize an argument about a certain concept, you should use the meaning that is used by the person you are criticizing, in this case Popper, otherwise you're comparing apples and oranges. That is just elementary logic.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

The point is not whether the Objectivist meaning is "valid", whatever that means (you can assign any meaning to a word if you want), but whether the Objectivist argument against Popper is valid when the Objectivist uses a different meaning than Popper and Hume. That is the criticism that you systematically ignore.

Dragonfly,

On the contrary, I have discussed this quite a lot and agreed with many points.

It helps if you read what I wrote, not what you want to see.

A completely unwarranted and nasty personal remark. You can do better than that.

Actually I think Ellen can do better than flat out state that I am no longer discussing ideas, but instead trying to trick her.

So, yes, my comment is warranted.

The argument is that Objectivists criticize Popper for the wrong reasons, namely by substituting their own definition for that of Popper.

Popper has no definition of induction that I know of. He doesn't like definitions and flat out said so.

You may not take Popper at his word, but I am beginning to.

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

One item that seems to be overlooked is what is hardwired into the human brain at birth and how that affects the acquisition of knowledge.

--Brant

[BaalChatzaf]

One item that seems to be overlooked is what is hardwired into the human brain at birth and how that affects the acquisition of knowledge.

--Brant

Induction occurs at the most basic and intuitive levels of thinking. Learning is a special case of induction. We learn from instances and by corrorecting the false rules we form when we do induction. Induction is how human beings go from instances to generality. It is a wired in mode of operation whether or not it is a valid mode of inference. Human Beings are natural born inductivists.

Ba'al; Chatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Bob,

The problem is not the meaning of induction, as has been clear. It is tribal. Rand against Popper and that kind of nonsense.

All I have been doing is maintaining an interest in objectively looking at both, and this tends to piss off both sides because I won't join either.

The tribal drums are beating.

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

Bob,

The problem is not the meaning of induction, as has been clear. It is tribal. Rand against Popper and that kind of nonsense.

All I have been doing is maintaining an interest in objectively looking at both, and this tends to piss off both sides because I won't join either.

The tribal drums are beating.

Michael

Ah, music to my ears. And don't forget the anti-tribal tribe!

--(sophistical) Brant

[Ellen Stuttle]

The problem [...] is tribal. Rand against Popper and that kind of nonsense.

For the record, to those who haven't been around long enough (or who have been but weren't following earlier discussions carefully enough) to be aware of this: I'm no more "a Popperian" than I'm "an Objectivist." Indeed, I think that the only person here who thinks of himself as "a Popperian" is Daniel, but Daniel isn't engaged in a tribal battle either.

Michael, at least your reply (which makes further hash of what I in fact said) makes clear that, after all the times Bob K. has explained to you what the term "valid" means in formal logic and why "induction" in either the Objectivist or Popper/Hume meaning is not a logically "valid" form of argument (a point conceded in the quote I posted from Ed Locke), you still don't grasp this point sufficiently to have framed an unambiguous question.

Dragonfly, thanks.

Ellen

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[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

You're kinda cute when you're sidestepping an issue. You're still not gonna answer, are ya'?

btw - I know of no one who has said you were a Popperian or an Objectivist, especially considering you have stated you were neither several times.

Sometimes I wonder if you even read my posts. You often admit you do not understand them.

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

I just reviewed every post on this thread. Obviously, mine were the best! Seriously, as I understand Popper he has made an important contribution to scientific methodology--falsification--Rand has not. As for "the problem of induction," it's only the problem of the irrefutable argument or proposition.(?) Rand obviously thought she had a lot of those arguments and couldn't really deal with the fact that they weren't overpowering no matter how great or important or interesting.

--Brant

[Ellen Stuttle]

The argument is that Objectivists criticize Popper for the wrong reasons, namely by substituting their own definition for that of Popper.

Popper has no definition of induction that I know of. He doesn't like definitions and flat out said so.

You may not take Popper at his word, but I am beginning to.

Also for the record -- I didn't have time to address that MSK mangling earlier: MSK misunderstands Popper on the issue of definitions. Popper doesn't object to definitions as such -- definitions sufficient to make clear what one is talking about. He objects to the idea that one could arrive at the correct definition.

In this of course, he very much disagrees with Rand. But there is a problem here which I think has never been well addressed in the debates on this list about the subject of Rand versus Popper on definitions, which is that Rand wasn't really talking about the definitions of words but instead about the correct classifying of concepts and structuring of a conceptual hierarchy.

This is an issue which I think needs considerable further exploring and explication. But I'm very much doubting that anything productive would come of "exploring and explication" on this list.

Ellen

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[Ellen Stuttle]

[....] Seriously, as I understand Popper he has made an important contribution to scientific methodology--falsification--Rand has not.

Yes, Popper has made not only "an important" but a vital "contribution to scientific methodology," which is the recognition that if a proposition isn't falsifiable, it is not in the domain of science.

As for "the problem of induction," it's only the problem of the irrefutable argument or proposition.(?)

In a way, yes, Brant, but what I think you leave out and what I think you exhibit no historical awareness of is the whole attempt to arrive at incontestably true beliefs.

A deductive argument starts from a premise or premises. With a "valid" (as defined in formal logic) deductive argument, IF the premise or premises are true (and if the reasoning has correctly proceeded according to the rules of deduction), then one is guaranteed to arrive at a true conclusion.

But...problem: The premise or premises of any deductive argument which is saying something about the facts of the world (i.e., which isn't starting out with a "by definition" tautology) is based on an "inductive" (in the broad sense of derived from experience) starting premise or premises.

Thus the certain truth of a validly arrived at deductive conclusion (about factual issues) is only as good as that of the certain truth of the starting premise or premises.

E.g., IF it is true that "All men are mortal" and IF it is true that "Socrates is a man," then "valid" deductive reasoning guarantees that "Socrates is mortal."

But suppose it isn't true that "All men are mortal" (or, trivially, that "Socrates is a man"), then you aren't guaranteed to arrive at a true conclusion from the starting premise or premises.

The search for a logically airtight defense of "induction" has been that of a search for starting from observations and arriving at guaranteed true conclusions.

Hume threw a "monkey wrench" into the search with his claim that it can't be consumated, that there is not any logically airtight way of starting from observations and arriving at guaranteed true conclusions.

The question of whether or not one might start from observations and arrive at guaranteed true conclusions (the question which Hume answered in the negative) is what has historically been called "the problem of induction." The Objectivst doctrine of "contextual certainty" hasn't solved it. Instead, this doctrine has conceded that there isn't a solution, while decrying Popper and Hume for having said just that.

Ellen

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Edited September 5, 2008 by Ellen Stuttle

[Brant Gaede]

But won't "guaranteed true conclusions" falsify falsification? In any case, "the problem of induction" strikes me not as a problem for what problems does it lead to "out there"? When I was growing up I was more concerned with communism and general thermonuclear war, so I never got to this stuff.

--Brant

[Ellen Stuttle]

But won't "guaranteed true conclusions" falsify falsification?

NO. I do get tired of that come-back. The impossibility of falsifying falsification is by-definition true, not derived-from-experience true. One can show by airtight deductive reasoning that...well, as O'ists would say it... "omniscience" (or alternately being around to make observations after the end of the universe) is definitionally self-contradictory.

In any case, "the problem of induction" strikes me not as a problem for what problems does it lead to "out there"? When I was growing up I was more concerned with communism and general thermonuclear war, so I never got to this stuff.

Well, I'm ever so glad it doesn't strike you as a problem. Try its not being a problem on with the AGWAs (AGWAlarmists) who claim that "the debate is over" and just see if general lack of understanding of the issue presents a problem. ;-)

Or with anyone who thinks that ethics comes from "the will of God" or from "the voice of the proletariate" or from "the State as superorganism." I'd venture to say, Brant, that the world at large not understanding the issue was more than slightly relevant to there ever having been the problems you were concerned with.

Ellen

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